Iraq Elections: Sudani Coalition appears Victorious

Iraq has held its sixth parliamentary elections since the toppling of Ba’ath Party rule in 2003. Despite the Sadrist Movement’s call for a boycott, the 56% turnout is higher than in the 2021 legislative polls, which saw only 43% cast ballots. Notably, the 2025 figures count 21M registered voters, whereas 30M Iraqis are old enough to cast ballots.   

Preliminary results suggest a win for incumbent Prime Minister Muhammad Shia’ Al-Sudani’s coalition, with 1.3M ballots nationwide. The Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) has also surpassed expectations, garnering some 1.1M votes—the highest-ever for a Kurdish party. Meanwhile, Sunni former parliament speaker Mohammed Al-Halbsousi’s Takaddum Front and Hikmah Movement leader Ammar Al-Hakim’s alliance have made advances.

However, no individual list commands enough support to single-handedly govern. Illustrating the fragmentation of the political stage, Sudani’s Reconstruction and Development Coalition won the highest number of votes, but that constitutes only 10% of ballots. Moreover, as seats are allocated based on governorate-level performance, there is no direct correlation between seats and nationwide total tallies.

These dynamics compel coalition-building. The norm is for the largest alliance to nominate the prime minister. In 2021, the Sadrist Movement emerged as the largest bloc, but failed in its mission to form a “national majority” government with Sunni Arab groups and the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP). Such an outcome would have sidelined the parties in the ruling Shiite Coordination Framework, which sought a consensus administration.

Prior to the Nov. 11 elections, some observers speculated that Sudani may consider a gambit that would somewhat echo the Sadrist play in 2021. Such a maneuver would rely on how many seats his coalition has garnered. Moreover, even if Kurdish and Sunni partners agree to join forces, success would likely require the inclusion of some Coordination Framework affiliates.

With the Federal Supreme Court’s ratification of vote results weeks away, and legal challenges likely to emerge, the outcome is far from certain as negotiations over government formation begins.

The turnout: As polls closed on Nov. 11, Sudani took to Twitter/X saying that his government had fulfilled its “obligations to ensure the peaceful transfer of power.”

  • While observers noted several outbreaks of violence and irregularities at some voting sites, election day overall continued a trend of being largely peaceful.

All in all, 12M Iraqis participated in the elections representing a total turnout of 56%, according to the Independent High Electoral Commission (IHEC).

  • Preliminary figures show that 10.9M Iraqis voted on Nov. 11, a turnout of 54.35%. Some 1.1M members of Iraq’s security forces and internally displaced persons (IDPs) cast ballots in early voting on Nov. 9, with respective participation of 72.52% and 77.35%.

Turnout was highest in the Kurdistan region of Iraq, with 76.07% of voters in Dohuk and 69.0% in Erbil casting ballots.

  • Preliminary numbers indicate continued voter apathy in Shiite-majority southern and central governorates, with only a few reaching above the 50% turnout mark. Some observers have suggested that this reflects dissatisfaction with the political establishment.

In the aftermath of the 2021 elections, Sadrist leader Muqtada Al-Sadr announced his final “exit” from Iraqi politics. Ahead of this year’s poll, Sadr rejected pleas by a number of prominent political figures for his movement’s return to the formal political process.

  • A noticeable differential in turnout between Baghdad’s two districts give some indication of the potential impact of Sadr’s call, though some experts have contested his influence given the higher turnout compared to 2021.
  • While the capital’s Karkh District saw a turnout of 53.27%, in neighboring Rusafa—which covers the Sadrist stronghold of Sadr City—only 41.55% showed up to vote.

The results: IHEC has released preliminary governorate-level tallies for the 31 alliances and 38 parties contesting the polls. The results also outline the fates of 75 independent and minority quota seat candidates.

  • The electoral commission has not released national totals, or how the results translate into seats. This has left observers and political blocs offering their own rough and often contradictory calculations.
  • The largest single winner in terms of votes—and likely in seats—is Sudani’s Reconstruction and Development Coalition. Erbil-based outlet Rudaw has suggested that the ticket’s roughly 1.3M votes could translate into 45 seats, although other sources speculate about upwards of 54 seats.

The results also suggest a possible redrawing of power within the Shiite political landscape, and especially among the Coordination Framework parties.

  • The constellation of Iran-allied groups has ruled Iraq since 2022. Its members decided to separately contest the Nov. 11 elections, at least partly to maximize the number of seats. However, this fragmentation has also given rise to questions about the fate of the alliance.

The State of Law bloc, a major Shiite actor led by former prime minister Nouri Al-Maliki (2006–14), has garnered a total of 728,000 votes. This may translate into upwards of 33 seats.

  • Qais Al-Khazali seems poised to take up the mantle of the political current aligned with the Popular Mobilization Units (PMU). The Sadiqoon Bloc, the electoral ticket of the Khazali-led Shiite armed group Asa’ib Ahl Al-Haq, won approximately 945,000 votes and may secure some 28 seats.
  • An alliance led by Shiite cleric and politician Hakim has performed better than his Hikmah Movement did in 2021. The half a million votes picked up by the alliance,  which some view as a potential supporter of Sudani for a second term, could translate into 19 seats.
  • Hadi Al-Ameri’s Badr Organization has won roughly 557,000 votes, which could garner his Iran-allied party approximately 22 seats. Of note, the main contest for leadership over the PMU-aligned current in Iraqi politics is between Ameri and Khazali, with the latter seen as representing a generational shift.

There have been some surprises on the Kurdish political stage. The Erbil-based KDP had a strong showing, surpassing its goal of achieving over 1M votes.

  • While its historic tally may give the party as many as 29 seats, the future of its influence in Baghdad—and broader relationship with the capital—depends on its role within any ruling coalition.

The KDP’s rivals in the Sulaimaniyah-based Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) will likely gain an extra seat over the 17 seats it garnered in the 2021 elections.

  • On the Sunni front, former speaker Halbousi (2018–23) is posed for a comeback at the forefront of Iraqi politics. The Sunni politician’s Takaddum Front has gained 945,000 votes, which could give him upwards of 37 seats.

Sudani’s showing suggests that he may be positioned to contest a second term, possibly outside of an alliance with the Coordination Framework that initially brought him to power.

  • However, if the trend of political bargaining following elections since 2005 is any indication, the incumbent premier faces a difficult battle.

The path ahead: The judicial rulings that introduced “largest bloc” and “blocking third” into Iraq’s political lexicon will govern the process of government formation.

  • Per a 2010 Federal Supreme Court ruling, the largest bloc is defined as either a united electoral coalition that won the most seats, or a post-vote alliance among parties that can form a majority.
  • Barring any judicial intervention that changes the nature of political bargaining, Iraq’s dominant blocs will likely contest not only each other, but may also see internal tensions emerge.

Observers suggest that Sudani’s coalition remains fragile. As it stands, the incumbent prime minister faces several options—and is far from guaranteed a second term.

  • One approach could be for Sudani to attempt to cobble together an alliance with Sunni and Kurdish parties as well as some Coordination Framework affiliates.
  • On the other hand, if he somehow manages to rally support from the parties which brought him to power in 2022, Sudani could pursue an effective renewal of the incumbent State Administration Coalition’s term.

In his first speech after the elections, Sudani said his coalition “remains open to all national forces without exception.”

  • In an interview after polls closed, Badr Organization head Ameri charged that the incumbent premier had “not demanded a second term” and that the matter was “in the hands of political forces.”

Tehran and Washington will also be watching the results with interest, with both capitals having historically played a significant role in the outcome of the bargaining process.

  • With Iran on the backfoot regionally, recent efforts by the US to command a stronger role in Baghdad could be reflected in the process of government formation.
  • Notably, US officials have reportedly demanded that Iran-backed factions such as Kata’ib Hezbollah must not have any role in Iraq’s next government. 
  • Reflecting the mood among some actors under US pressure, Badr Organization Ameri on Nov. 11 insisted that “the Iraqi people will reject any foreign interference.