2019 – An open letter to U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo par Roudi Baroudi, Économiste de l’énergie – Lettre ouverte au secrétaire d’État américain Mike Pompeo
An open letter to U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo
RE: Your Visit to Lebanon – Energy Diplomacy
Dear Mr. Secretary:
Your visit to Lebanon comes at a moment of both rare opportunity and significant peril for this part of the world. I note this not only as a citizen of Lebanon, but also as a resident of the long-troubled Euro-Mediterranean region, and my purpose is to avert a new round of instability for my country and its neighbors.
Multiple world-class hydrocarbon deposits have now been discovered beneath the Eastern Mediterranean Sea, offering a historic chance to upgrade the regional economy, reduce or eliminate poverty, calm regional tensions, improve security and increase international cooperation. Unfortunately, development of these resources is being delayed because so few states have agreed to maritime borders with their neighbors. Setting aside the fate of Palestine, there are 12 “Frontier” boundaries among the seven main coastal states – Greece, Turkey, Cyprus, Syria, Lebanon, Israel and Egypt – and only two (17 percent) have been settled by bilateral treaties meeting current Law of the Sea standards. In a region containing more than $1 trillion worth of oil and gas, therefore, 83 percent of the maritime borders remain unresolved, posing significant risks to development in several countries – including Lebanon.
With so much of the region facing severe economic problems, the need to expedite development and the ensuing revenues could not be more urgent. Luckily, however, modern mapping technologies now make it possible for LOS applications to settle all such offshore disputes peacefully, and to do so with both relative ease and near-absolute accuracy.
These solutions are exceedingly relevant to your visit. Your meetings here will deal with multiple topics and the linkages among them, but the most portentous is the perennial U.S. project to foster agreement on maritime boundaries in the Eastern Med, in particular that between Lebanon’s Exclusive Economic Zone and Israel’s. This is the single area in which U.S. policy has the greatest capacity to effect positive changes – but also the greatest potential for unintended consequences.
Lebanon was one of 50 founding signatories to the United Nations Charter in 1945. Ever since, Lebanese foreign policy has been seated in the Charter’s terms, chief among them the obligation to always seek peaceful resolutions of international disputes. That commitment remains very much intact, and this despite the difficult circumstances that Lebanon has long faced as a front-line state in the Arab-Israeli conflict.
Despite – and at least partly because of – their country’s difficult location and flawed system of government, the Lebanese exhibit tremendous powers of resilience and an uncanny ability to reinvent themselves. Whatever the crisis, the people of this country are highly adept at making the necessary adjustments. But this cycle cannot continue indefinitely, especially when the national debt is equivalent to more than 150 percent of GDP. Indeed, at a recent aid conference in Paris, donor countries made it clear that their pledges will not materialize unless and until Lebanon implements sweeping reforms, serious anti-corruption measures, and other meaningful steps to get its financial house in order.
Notwithstanding these and other challenges, we may be on the cusp of a prosperous new era. I refer, of course, to the potentially large quantities of offshore hydrocarbons that Lebanon hopes to start tapping in the coming years. If and when production starts, the impacts will be nothing short of game-changing. Just producing natural gas for its own consumption would allow Lebanon’s most important power stations to stop running on the fuel oil and gasoil that increase operating costs, burn dirtier, and wear down generating equipment.
Based on what I’ve learned from 40-plus years in the energy business, that would just be the beginning because Lebanon also stands to become an energy exporter, opening up substantial new revenues. First, the state would be able to slash deficit spending, borrow at lower rates, and start retiring its debt stock. Next, the government would have the wherewithal to make unprecedented investments in roads, schools, hospitals, and other essential infrastructure. Coupled with the direct and indirect opportunities generated by the emerging energy sector, this would have an immediate and prolonged stimulus effect, leading to tens or even hundreds of thousands of well-paying jobs. It would also make the entire economy more competitive, provide our youth with the education they need to thrive in the 21st century, and give all Lebanese access to quality health care. If wisely managed, gas revenues also could eradicate the poverty and accompanying social inequalities that provide terrorist groups with such fertile recruiting grounds.
I have no doubt that we Lebanese can make our country work, but we need to make difficult choices and craft workable solutions on our own, not implement those demanded by a foreign power – ANY foreign power, no matter how well-intentioned. In fact, many of our current problems stem precisely from decisions that were made in haste, under outside pressure, and/or without sufficient domestic consensus. Nonetheless, many Lebanese are grateful for the US role in mediating the EEZ issue with Israel; on the other hand, many others suspect that Washington’s purpose is not to facilitate a fair deal, but rather to impose a lopsided one that favors Israel. Any Lebanese government that signs such a deal will face a significant loss in perceived legitimacy, a significant rise in domestic opposition, multiple resignations by key Cabinet ministers, and possibly the end of its ability to govern.
There are plenty of hydrocarbons in the Levant Basin for all rightful claimants to receive what is rightfully theirs, and no Lebanese is asking for special favors, just fair and equal treatment. The facts of Lebanon’s EEZ case are immutable, starting with the correct location of the land border at Ras Naqoura, which was established under the 1949 Armistice Agreement and can now be precisely situated by precision mapping techniques. All else flows from that, and in any judicial proceedings, each scientific element is weighed against a common set of LOS rules, which derive primarily from three sources: 1) the 1982 U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), a project originally conceived by then-U.S. President Truman and now adopted by 168 countries as the basis for the only global LOS rulebook; 2) the principles and procedures laid down in UNCLOS and subsequent amendments; and 3) the precedents established by UNCLOS’ court, the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS), and other relevant legal proceedings. By all objective observation, technological advances have reached the point where their effect is decisive. In fact, all 13 of the most recent court cases have been adjudicated primarily on the basis of precision mapping.
Based on the rules and the science, then, there can be little doubt about what a verdict in this case would mean: Lebanon would be awarded most of the 881 square kilometers in dispute. So should it be in any out-of-court settlement. We know this because whether delineation is determined inside or outside a courtroom, the same rules apply and the same science drives the outcome: the lines are drawn according to science in the form of the best available maps (which can now be ordered up and received within five business days at most) of the two states’ coastal zones. In fact, by some reckonings, preparing an LOS case is now 80 percent scientific work and only 20 percent legal procedure. Crucially, too, Israel has accepted the applicability of the LOS rules by having agreed to them as the basis for its 2010 EEZ treaty with Cyprus.
Of course, you know the complications: Israel is not a signatory to UNCLOS, so an ITLOS verdict is impossible, and Lebanon does not recognize Israel, so bilateral negotiations are out. Hence the need for outside mediation, and hence the constructive and perhaps indispensable role of the United States, depending on what role it decides to play. If America acts as an arbiter, the end-result cannot be in doubt because it will be based on science and the LOS rules. Such an exercise of fair play could give the entire region a chance to defuse tensions and change direction – and help achieve U.S. goals for the region in terms of security and cooperation. On the other hand, should the United States decide to act primarily as Israel’s advocate, it will not be possible for the Lebanese government to accept any proposal that strays materially from the rules and the science.
Since we already know the destination, and that it would benefit both parties, why not take the shortest and surest route? Advise the Israelis to accept a fair EEZ arrangement in a timely fashion, make sure they (and we) honor both the letter and the spirit of that arrangement, and convince them to stop threatening the Lebanese with war. Then watch a shared financial incentive for calm work its magic. The resulting drop in tensions would surely abet another U.S. goal by reducing the threat of trouble at the border, and the longer the Israelis refrained from provocations, the less incentive – and less support – any other actor would have to rock the boat. And were the United States to broker a balanced solution here, it would strengthen its ability to mediate among other nearby states – especially Cyprus, Greece, and Turkey – and therefore have a stabilizing effect on the entire region.
I, for one, hope that the United States, partly in concert with other actors like the U.N., will continue to use its good offices to help resolve the EEZ matter as equitably as possible. I also hope that progress in this effort will open the way for meaningful internal dialogues, too, about far-reaching reforms on the political and economic levels. In short, Mr. Secretary, we Lebanese need to get real, and the United States can help us do that – but only if it means to help Lebanon, not just Israel, and all Lebanese, not just some of us.
Sincerely, Roudi Baroudi, Économiste de l’énergie
How to Fix East Med Border Disputes par Roudi Baroudi and Debra Cagan
The Eastern Mediterranean is once again at the center of what can go wrong when countries fail to resolve decades-old disputes over offshore Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZs). On the face of it, the latest Greece-Turkey skirmish makes little sense now other than playing to domestic audiences and putting down markers to ensure a future piece of whatever this natural gas-rich part of the world has to offer. In today’s brutal economic climate, few energy companies are lining up to undertake new projects, which means it will take longer for actual production to begin under the best circumstances. What’s more, Turkey may not have the financial wherewithal or capacity to do the exploration and development work on its own, and no private energy company is likely to invest serious capital in a project that can be tied up for years by competing EEZ claims. This maximalist approach to solving maritime disputes will not work. Equitable results, perhaps based on the equidistance principle — a methodology endorsed by the 1994 UN Convention for Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) — would be the best way forward for settling the Greece-Turkey maritime boundary dispute.
The development of Israel’s huge Leviathan natural gas field is a model studied closely by others in this region. Texas-based Noble Energy, which is now merging with Chevron, discovered Leviathan 10 years ago and quickly recognized that it was not only a world-class field, but that it needed an EEZ treaty for development to proceed without being contested by Cyprus. Noble carried out its own internal Law of the Sea desktop study, which became the basis for Israel’s EEZ treaty with Cyprus. It also issued an ultimatum to the Israelis that no further exploration would take place until the EEZ deal was finalized. This pressure from Noble not only prompted the Israeli government to conclude a treaty with Cyprus, it did so in a document that explicitly states Israel must adhere to UNCLOS rules despite not being a signatory of the treaty. That in itself is an enormous change with broad economic implications.
While four of the seven recognized coastal states (Greece, Turkey, Syria, Cyprus, Lebanon, Israel and Egypt), are not signatories to the treaty, there is now a general understanding that even non-signatories to UNCLOS are increasingly ready to abide by its principles in settling disputes. The real threat to the East Mediterranean’s prospects as an energy hub is politics, specifically the zero-sum games that have constricted and warped regional interactions. The best way to proceed is an orderly process in which Mediterranean maritime boundaries are fully delineated and individual countries are free to develop the resources within their respective EEZs. The UNCLOS contains a comprehensive rulebook for the fair and equitable resolution of such disputes by subjecting them to consistent legal standards and detailed scientific observations.
Given the UNCLOS, the obvious question is: Why are we still talking about unresolved maritime boundaries in the Eastern Mediterranean? The short answer is that until recently few of the necessary conditions were in place. Since its inception, both technology and case law have evolved. Old colonial-era charts were highly unreliable, with depictions of even easily observable shoreline features off by a kilometer or more. New, accurate technological mapping has removed much of the guesswork. The outcome of any legal process based on UNCLOS can now be predicted with considerable reliability.
The Israel-Cyprus treaty has itself been challenged by Lebanon, which has alleged that its neighbors used faulty coordinates for its shoreline border with Israel, thereby mistakenly locating the offshore “tripoint” among the three countries’ respective EEZs several kilometers from where it should be. But Israel has agreed to be bound by UNCLOS standards, making resolution possible. The situation also makes clear that precision mapping technology — now at the disposal of any government willing to pay for a Law of the Sea study — has finally established a clear, objective basis for discussion.
In what could be a valuable point for both Turkey and Greece, this crucial degree of accuracy, often down to sub-meter measurements, should make it easier for governments to sell any agreements they reach to their respective publics. It also leaves too little room for naysayers at home or abroad to accuse anyone of backing down or selling out. German efforts to reconcile the interests of Turkey and Greece are commendable, and with precision mapping accuracy both governments can reduce economic and political pressure while simultaneously demonstrating the potential advantages of reconciliation.
The Eastern Mediterranean’s emergence as an oil and gas hub promises a cure for the region’s poverty and instability. The first discoveries were located in uncontested waters off Egypt and Israel, so development was fairly straightforward. In addition, most of the deposits were in the form of natural gas, whose cleaner properties and growing ubiquity as a global commodity, may give it better medium- and long-term market prospects than oil.
These discoveries and others that could follow are critical for the growing economies in the region, which need greater energy diversity and independence. Commercial interest in these resources also remains strong. Noble’s East Mediterranean gas interests are considered one of the prize assets that Chevron was after in its bid. The energy majors already invested in offshore Cyprus, including the Exxon Mobil/Qatar Petroleum (QP) and Total/Eni consortia, have postponed — not canceled — exploratory drilling in their respective blocks. The involvement of QP is also a signal of long-term stability. As one of the world’s most deep-pocketed national oil companies, its gas strategy is measured in decades, as Energy Minister Saad al-Kaabi likes to say.
Even with the current extraordinary economic circumstances of the coronavirus pandemic, for which few companies and governments were prepared, the East Med should remain attractive and financially appealing going forward. The resources are still there and, while their current market value has been diminished, the potential deposits are still highly prized assets whose development, extraction and sale can be expected to generate many hundreds of billions of dollars over several decades. Despite the increasing competitiveness of renewables, the ubiquity and low carbon profile of gas will keep it in the global energy mix for years to come.
is the Distinguished Energy Fellow at the Transatlantic Leadership Network. She is a former career US State Department and Defense Department official, having served from the Reagan to the Trump administrations.
Qatar sets perfect example for would-be energy exporters in Mediterranean
It’s because Qatar had made an early bet on liquefied natural gas that helped the country to emerge as the world’s most prolific exporter of LNG, a position it retains to this day. It was good governance that made sure this resource has been very well-managed, a top energy expert said.
Attending a major energy congress in Athens, Roudi Baroudi, a veteran of the energy business who has helped shape policy for companies, governments, and even entities like the European Union, the World Bank and the United Nations, noted the North Field Expansion Project is a massive undertaking that will grow LNG output from the current 77 million tons per annum to 110 MTPA over the next five years. That will not only increase Qatar’s lead over other producers, but also give it the wherewithal to keep diversifying its holdings abroad.
Speaking on the sidelines of the First Annual Eastern Mediterranean Energy Leadership Summit, Baroudi (pictured), currently the CEO of Doha-based Energy and Environment Holding, elaborated on ‘how did a tiny country like Qatar become such a giant in the gas business?”.
“Once the full extent of the country’s natural gas reserves were understood, the government sought out the best advice, then undertook comprehensive studies to understand market conditions and forecasts, define its own needs and capabilities, and identify the best partners. As a result of these analyses, Qatar made an early bet on liquefied natural gas that soon made it the world’s most prolific exporter of LNG, a position it retains to this day.” He noted that it’s not only this domestic megaproject (North Field Expansion) that matters. Qatar Petroleum, for instance, is in talks to secure partners for the establishment of a new LNG distribution terminal on Germany’s North Sea Coast. Again, this a mutual benefit proposition from start to finish, with the German side increasing its energy security and the Qataris lining up future revenues by securing access to a crucial market. In addition, QP recently entered a new agreement that books LNG offloading facilities at the Belgian Port of Zeebrugge until 2044.
Other developments paint a similar picture of a wide-ranging strategy that keeps Qatar in its leading position by capitalizing on both its market influence and its financial resources. In July, QP took a 49 percent stake in a joint venture with Chevron Philips Chemical Co. (51 percent) that will see the partners develop a huge petrochemical complex – including the world’s largest ethylene cracker – on the US Gulf Coast, taking advantage of the proximity of America’s most productive shale gas regions. And just a couple of weeks ago, QatarGas made history when one of its massive Q-Flex LNG carriers, the Thumama, became the first vessel of its class to complete an open-water ship-toship transfer to a floating storage and regasification unit off Bangladesh’s Moheshkhali Terminal.
Qatari investments and expertise are also driving exploration activities in several countries around the world. “Qatar is not sitting on its hands. Day in and day out, in all sorts of ways, the country is constantly taking stupendous strides toward bigger and better things to come”, he said.
Qatar steps over the blockade : Two years after the economic and political boycott on Qatar, the Gulf state is pressing on with LNG expansion plans par Gerald Butt, économiste pétrolier
Qatar Petroleum (QP) in April asked three joint ventures to bid for the main engineering, procurement and construction (EPC) contract for four mega-LNG trains, each with 8.8mn t/yr capacity, and related facilities. A month later it asked firms to bid to carry out EPC work for LNG storage and loading facilities.
QP announced in 2017, after the boycott was imposed, that it planned to increase LNG output capacity from 77mn t/yr to 100mn t/yr, by producing more gas from the vast offshore North field. The following year it unveiled an even more ambitious plan — to target capacity of 110mn t/yr. And despite the fact that there is no end to the political dispute that has destroyed the credibility of the Gulf Cooperation Council, Qatar is not looking back.
The consortiums competing for the contracts to build the mega-trains are: Chiyoda and Technip; JGC Corporation and Hyundai Engineering and Construction; and Saipem, McDermott and CTCI Corporation. The announcement of the EPC contract is expected in January 2020, with work to be completed by 2024. Qatar believes that the new development will come on stream just as demand for LNG will start to exceed supply.
McDermott International has been given the EPC role for eight new offshore jackets in the North field. Onshore site preparation for the four LNG trains at Ras Laffan is being carried out by Consolidated Contractors Company and Teyseer Trading and Contracting Company. Chiyoda is completing the FEED work for the onshore facilities, and further contract awards related to the expansion project are expected in the coming months.
During 2018, Qatar maintained its position as the largest exporter of LNG, with 28pc of global market share, according to the International Gas Union. However, with other countries increasing capacity, Qatar’s share has been falling. Australia has now overtaken Qatar as the biggest producer — but will be nudged out of that spot when the Ras Laffan expansion is complete.
Call for talks
In the meantime, Qatar continues to call for talks to end the political dispute with its neighbours, but they appear to have no interest in ending the boycott. « The countries besieging Qatar know it is ready to sit down at the negotiating table, whether under the aegis of the GCC or any other set-up, » says Roudi Baroudi, a Doha-based energy consultant. « Qatari officials remain hopeful that their counterparts will soon change course and join the search for sovereign, fair and workable solutions. »
For now at least, Qatar is prepared to carry on regardless — without undue concern. The IMF said in late 2018 that « significant fiscal and external buffers have enabled Qatar to successfully absorb the adverse shocks from the 2014-16 decline in oil prices and the diplomatic rift. We anticipate overall real GDP growth of 3.1pc in 2019, with still robust non-hydrocarbon growth and recovery in oil and gas production. »
In Baroudi’s view, « while Qataris continue to face illegal and discriminatory measures attached to the commercial blockade, their country has the wherewithal to sustain the current situation for as long as it takes ».
New LNG carriers
To cater for the North Field expansion and Qatar’s offtake from the Golden Pass LNG export project in the US, QP in April issued an invitation to tender for the construction of LNG carriers. QP CEO Saad al-Kaabi says the initial order would be to « deliver 60 LNG carriers in support of the planned production expansion, with a potential to exceed 100 new carriers over the next decade ».
Sarkis a déjà adressé aux hauts responsables libanais une lettre ouverte sous le titre « La politique pétrolière et gazière libanaise : des anomalies désastreuses ».
Malheureusement, la situation n’a pas changé depuis et le Dr Sarkis parlera des rêves suscités par le pétrole qui risquent de finir en cauchemars si les responsables n’agissent pas dans les plus brefs délais et dans les normes car la formation d’un organisme national pour les hydrocarbures doit être suivi d’actions concrètes pour que les travaux d’extraction et les accords y relatifs se concrétisent.
Le conférencier fera donc le point de la situation et mettra en garde contre des anomalies qui pourraient être désastreuses. Autre cri d’alarme : que le développement d’une production pétrolière et gazière au large du Liban ne connaisse pas des effets pervers semblables à ce qui est appelé en économie la « maladie hollandaise » porteuse d’inflation, de corruption et de régression des activités économiques traditionnelles.
LES DISCOURS et INTERVENTIONS
- Discours d’introduction de M. Nicolas Abou Chahine, Secrétaire général de la CCFL
- Texte d’intervention de Monsieur Nicolas SARKIS
LA REVUE DE PRESSE DE LA CONFERENCE
|Stratégies et Politiques Energétiques (SPE)
Article à venir par Francis Perrin, président de la revue SPE
Diffusion mercredi 29 juin 2016 : Le Liban oublié par l’exploration pétrolière en Méditerranée – Par Claire Fages RFI Chronique des Matières premières 5h18 (monde), 8h22 (Afrique), 8h52 (monde) heure Paris Pour écouter cliquer ici
Pétrole et Gaz au Liban : les potentialités, les chances et les risques par le Dr. Zeina El Tibi Cet article a été publié dans: Numéro 100 – Juillet 2016
Fondateur et Président de 1965 à 2012 de l’Arab Petroleum Research Center, éditeur de publications sur le pétrole et le gaz naturel au Moyen-Orient et en Afrique du Nord, le Dr Nicolas Sarkis, expert pétrolier mondial, a traité des gisements de gaz et de pétrole au large du Liban que les autorités tardent à exploiter, au cours de la conférence qu’il a donnée le 27 juin à l’invitation de la Chambre de Commerce Franco-Libanaise à Paris. LIRE LA SUITE
تعثر سياسة البترول والغاز في لبنان: العقبات والآفاق المفتوحة
بعد موجة التفاؤل التي أثارتها النتائج المشجعة لعمليات المسح الزلزالي في المياه اللبنانية، وفي أعقاب الاكتشافات التي تمّت في كل من إسرائيل وغزة وقبرص، أخذت التدابير اللازمة لانطلاق صناعة البترول والغاز في لبنان تتعثر منذ ما يقارب الثلاث سنوات، الى أن وصلت الى المأزق الحالي. ويعود هذا التعثر لأسباب عدة، خارجية وداخلية. الأسباب الخارجية ترتبط بشكل خاص بالهبوط الحاد في أسعار البترول والغاز العالمية منذ منتصف 2014، من جهة، وبالنزاع مع اسرائيل حول ترسيم الحدود البحرية، من جهة ثانية. اما العوامل الداخلية فتتركز على تضارب المصالح ووجهات النظر بين بعض الجهات السياسية، وعلى امتناع مجلس الوزراء حتى الآن عن إقرار مشروعَي مرسومَين تطبيقيَّين لقانون البترول 132/2010 لا بدّ LIRE LA SUITE منهما للدخول في مرحلتي التنقيب والإنتاج.
|28 juin 2016 – Le pétrole et le gaz au Liban
Expert mondialement reconnu sur les questions de pétrole, Nicolas Sarkis a donné lundi soir une conférence sur la possibilité de voir le Liban devenir un pays pétrolier. Conférence organisée par la Chambre de commerce franco-libanaise. Les explications Nicolas Sarkis, Expert sur les questions de pétrole et président de SARKIS ENERGY. Propos recueillis par Loïc Barrière – Pour écouter cliquer
|L’article d’Elias Masboungi : Nicolas Sarkis lance un pave dans la mare nostrum|
|LA TRIBUNE (basée sur l’article d’Elias Masboungi): Pétrole et gaz au Liban : les potentialités, les chances et les risques|
|Magazine Ngambo Na Ngambo par Lilo Miango
Photo : Nicolas Sarkis entouré par les journalistes Lilo Miango et Elias Masboungi. Photo Magazine Ngambo Na Ngambo
Pétrole et gaz naturel : une bénédiction ou une malédiction pour le Liban ? par Nicolas Sarkis pour l’Orient-le-Jour
L’exploration pétrolière ou gazière au large du Liban peut devenir, à première vue, un facteur de relance économique. Mais ce n’est pas une garantie de prospérité pour le peuple, comme le prouvent les expériences – parfois désastreuses – d’autres pays en développement, et le partage du gâteau qui s’annonce au pays du Cèdre. Pour éviter les écueils, rien de tel que les garde-fous.
La découverte, qui reste à confirmer, de pétrole et de gaz naturel au large des côtes libanaises pourrait évidemment être, à première vue, hautement bénéfique pour le Liban et pour l’économie du pays : couverture des besoins énergétiques nationaux, possibilité éventuelle d’exportation pouvant générer des revenus considérables, règlement de la dette publique de 62,4 milliards de dollars (145,3 % du PIB), une grande aisance des finances publiques, création d’emplois, lancement de projets de développement dont le pays a un si grand besoin dans les différents domaines des infrastructures, de la santé, de l’éducation, de l’industrie, de l’agriculture, du tourisme, etc. Une étude élaborée tout récemment par la Banque Audi évoque, après bien d’autres, les retombées positives et loin d’être négligeables d’une telle perspective sur les différents secteurs de l’économie libanaise. Elle estime en particulier à pas moins de 600 milliards de dollars, soit près du décuple de la dette extérieure et 14 fois le PIB actuel du Liban, la valeur des réserves pétrolières et gazières supposées jusqu’ici exister sous les eaux territoriales. La banque prend toutefois la précaution de préciser que ses estimations sont basées sur les chiffres avancés par le ministère de l’Énergie et par les compagnies qui ont procédé à des travaux d’exploration.LIRE LA SUITE
SEMINAIRE SUR LE PETROLE ET LE GAZ AU LIBAN DU 9 MAI 2014
organisé à l’initiative du « Forum pour le Dialogue National » et en coopération avec l’Ecole Supérieure des Affaires de Beyrouth (ESA) et le « Mouvement des Entreprises et Représentations Economiques Françaises au Liban » (MEREF).