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LE TEXTE FONDATEUR PAR ROGER EDDE

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Qui est Roger Eddé?

Roger Eddé est un homme politique et penseur libanais d’envergure internationale. Né le 21 aout 1941 à Eddé ( Byblos/Jbeil), Liban. Chrétien maronite. Études au Collèges Aintoura et La Sagesse, puis université Saint-Joseph, Diplômé en droit français et libanais, Avocat d’affaires international depuis 1963.

• • • • • En 1976 Roger Eddé s’exile en France et aux États Unis suite à l’irruption de la Syrie au Liban. 
        • En 1982 il propose l’option révolutionnaire de « Liban Neutre » en réponse au déchaînement guerrier qui ravage son pays. 
        • En 1988, candidat naturel à l’élection présidentielle, il va refuser de participer à tout scrutin sous occupation syrienne.
        • En 1994 à Paris, il fonde le Congrès National Libanais qui réunit l’ensemble des forces politiques hostiles à l’occupation syrienne. Et notamment le Général Michel Aoun et Dory Chamoun.
        • En 2005, après l’assassinat du Premier Ministre Rafic Hariri, il participe à la Révolution des cèdres et s’associe au mouvement du 14 mars.
        • En 2006, en réaction à toutes les dérives partisanes et aux nouvelles menaces pour la paix, il fonde le Parti Assalam, ou Parti libanais de la paix.

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Le texte fondateur « The challenge of Lebanon » : la Politique internationale pour sauver le Liban ou comment sauver le Liban des autres et des siens (FR)

Le salut du Liban pose un problème double…    

Situé au centre géographique des confits du Proche-Orient, le Liban est un pion sur l’échiquier des puissances locales. Comme un certain nombre d’Etats placés dans des régions-tampons, le Liban est ainsi à la merci d’événements internationaux sur lesquels il ne peut pas, en fonction même de ses moyens, exercer une influence déterminante. On cherche à se le partager, comme on se partageait autrefois la Pologne, ou comme on avait songé plus récemment à se partager l’Autriche. C’est donc en premier lieu des autres que le Liban doit être sauvé : des Syriens et des Israéliens, et de leurs alliés respectifs.

Mais, simultanément, le problème libanais est aussi un problème intérieur. Rassemblement de dix-sept dénominations religieuses et d’une multitude de tendances politiques dont l’unité n’a été préservée que grâce au génie politique de son peuple, le Liban devient un pays dangereusement instable lorsque les pressions exercées de l’extérieur parviennent à influence et à manipuler ses dirigeants. C’est alors siens également que le Liban doit être sauvé.

Sauver le Liban des Autres 

La Syrie reste aujourd’hui un projet. Celui, d’abord, des administrateurs coloniaux Français qui, pour se faciliter la tâche, avaient voulu intégrer en une nation unie quatre Etats autonomes-Alaouite d’Alep, de Damas et n 1921 du Djebel Druze ; celui, ensuite des idéologues de la grande Syrie qui menacée de partition par les tendances autonomistes de populations à fortes identités, font rêver leurs masses d’une renaissance de la nation islamo-arabe des Omayades (639-750) dont ils seraient les maîtres.

Ces dix dernières années, les quelques dirigeants maronites libanais (tels Franjié, Gemayel et Chamoun) qui se sont disputés les faveurs du régime alaouite de la famille Assad n’ont pu  surmonter la complexité et la contradiction de ce projet. Négligeant l’idéologie nationaliste arabe du parti baassiste, ils ont cru trop facilement à la préoccupation séparatiste alaouite des hommes  au pouvoir à Damas qui, plus que jamais défiés par la majorité sunnite, pensaient se replier sur la région alaouite-chrétienne allant des frontières syro-libanaises aux frontières syro-turques. Ils ont ainsi espéré qu’un Liban dirigé par les minorités chrétiennes serait éventuellement l’allié naturel de l’Etat alaouite.

Mais en jouant eux aussi la carte syrienne, les Palestiniens et leurs alliés de la gauche libanaise ont, dans une certaine mesure, commis l’erreur  inverse. Trop attentifs au discours idéologique du Baas syrien, ils ont négligé les intérêts régionaux  et les considérations d’ordre interne qui régissent l’exercice du pouvoir absolu des Alaouites et du président Hafez El-Assad.

Courtisée d’un côté comme de l’autre, la Syrie s’est ainsi présentée en 1975-1976 comme l’arbitre d’une confrontation au Liban qu’elle a encouragée davantage en manipulant les deux protagonistes principaux ; notamment, les milices maronites du Front Libanais qui ont voulu, mais un peu tard, renverser l’Accord du Caire de 1969 en éliminant l’OLP (et, par la même occasion, ses alliés de la gauche libanaise) comme l’avait fait le roi Hussein quelques années plus tôt. Mais parallèlement, l’influence de la Syrie sur l’OLP a été d’autant plus destructrice qu’elle s’est exercée au travers de la « Saïka » et autres formations paramilitaires palestiniennes d’obédience syrienne, avec l’approbation des forces progressistes libanaises qui ont cru pouvoir compenser par la force des armes leur impuissance électorale.

Le jeu syrien s’est accompagné d’un jeu israélien comparable, conduisant ainsi ces deux Etats à poursuivre une stratégie de frères-ennemis qui vise à un contrôle de fait et par étapes du territoire libanais.

Longuement discuté dans les années cinquante, le projet israélien pour le Liban a visé à l’image d’israél, serait à prédominance confessionnelle. Placée dans la perspective israélienne-« dominatrice et sûre d’elle-même »-la formule libanaise de coexistence intercommunautaire dans le pluralisme démocratique constituait déjà, au lendemain de l’Armistice de 1949, un défi politique difficile.

Plus tard, un démantèlement de l’Etat libanais a été le cas à deux reprises ces quatre dernières années, que le Liban n’exerçant plus sa souveraineté, Israél se devait de le libérer de l’emprise palestinienne et de l’occupation syrienne afin de le rendre aux Libanais-ceux de son choix, évidemment et suivant des conditions politiques et territoriales à convenance israélienne enfin et de tout temps, le projet israélien au Liban a préconisé une révision des frontières définies par la Convention du 23 décembre 1920 et confirmées dans la Convention d’Armistice signée en 1949.En fait, Israël, qui n’a jamais toléré l’exploitation libanaise des eaux du Litania continué à aspirer à une expansion territoriale qui ferait du Liban-Sud une terre d’Israël.

L’implantation de l’OLP au Liban a donc servi de prétexte et de catalyseur à l’application des dessins mutuels et complémentaires de la Syrie et d’Israël.

Déjà, en 1969-1970, alors que les forces palestiniennes commençaient à s’installer au Liban avec un contingent armé d’à peine 200 hommes, il était possible d’en prévoir les conséquences. Pour éviter au Liban d’être enlisé dans le conflit israélo-arabe, l’armée libanaise aurait pu, à l’époque, se défaire facilement d’une présence militaire née des concessions abusives faites au Caire par le général Boustani, et à Beyrouth par un gouvernement libanais comprenant les partis phalangiste et chamouniste. Mais en dépit de l’opposition énergie du Bloc National Libanais, l’Accord du Caire avait rendu quasiment inévitable la confrontation entre l’organisation administrative et militaire de l’OLP d’une part, et la souveraineté libanaise d’autre part.

Expulsée de Jordanie en 1970, l’OLP s’était incrustée de plus en plus massivement au sein de la démocratie libanaise, au nom d’une cause dont l’énorme majorité du peuple libanais-Chrétiens et Musulmans- s’est toujours sentie totalement solidaire. Après la guerre de 1973, cette présence de l’OLP- un Etat Palestinien dans l’Etat libanais- avait été accélérée par une diplomatie américaine qui, en négligeant la frontière israélo-libanais, l’ouvrait aux ambitions syriennes et israéliennes aussi bien qu’aux besoins palestiniens, préparent ainsi sept années de calvaire et de tragédie.

Sauver le Liban des siens

En place, pour la plupart, depuis l’indépendance, les dirigeants politiques du Liban n’ont pas fait avancer la nation dans le sens de la déconfessionnalisation, de la justice sociale et de la démocratie. Bien au contraire, ils ont permis au pays de sombrer dans une immobilisme né d’une néo-féodalité politique qui n’a d’autre raison d’être que la conservation du pouvoir et le partage des privilèges. Dans un premier temps, une telle situation a été facilitée par la prospérité du pays qui, en multipliant les opportunités économiques, éloignait les nouvelles générations de l’action politique. Cette mise à distance a été également encouragée par une ingérence du Deuxième Bureau de l’armée- un genre de « Savak » libanais- dans la vie politique du pays depuis 1959 jusqu’à l’élection présidentielle de 1970 (centrée sur le thème de libération de la démocratie  libanaise de la corruption et des abus politiques de la dite organisation).

Plus tard, le renouveau national annoncé par l’indignation populaire exprimée aux élections de 1970,a été contrecarré par le jeu des factions paramilitaires. Issues de la faiblesse du gouvernement central, celles-ci ont naturellement cherché à en empêcher un renforcement qui leur aurait coûté leurs privilèges, et leurs revenus de mercenaires.

Parmi les agissements de ces factions, la volonté  phalangiste d’exercer un pouvoir absolu s’est particulièrement manifestée. Fondé par Pierre Gemayel en 1936 sur le modèle fasciste de l’époque, le parti phalangiste a toujours compté sur une milice soigneusement disciplinée et illicitement armée. Bien que bâtie autour du slogan révélateur « Lubnana Lana » (littéralement « le Liban est à nous »), leur représentation parlementaire est néanmoins restée marginale.

C’est dans une perspective qu’il faut suivre ces dix dernières années la collaboration des Phalangistes avec l’OLP, en 1969 (concrétisée par la ratification de l’Accord du Caire) avec la Syrie ensuite (pour affronter l’alliance palestino-progressiste en 1975-1976) et avec Israël, enfin, pour affronter l’OLP. Le but de ces Phalangistes : mettre la main sur le Liban ou sur ce qui en restait (c’est-à-dire sur un Liban éventuellement réduit mais dominé par les Maronites, eux-mêmes représentés par un parti phalangistes unique qui exercerait un pouvoir absolu en intégrant l’armée libanaise – soigneusement épurée – dans les milices du parti, ou vice-versa)

Après des années d’une brutalité qui n’a épargné ni les Musulmans (Libanais ou Palestiniens) ni les Maronites eux-mêmes, les milices phalangistes aspirèrent alors à résoudre – avec l’aide d’Israël et, par ricochet, celle des Etats-Units – la question libanaise au travers d’une répression et d’un alignement qui portaient en eux les germes de la guerre civile et d’un mortel isolement économico-politique.

Les précédents historiques d’un Liban déchiré par de telles manœuvres ne sont que trop nombreux. Il en a été ainsi de 1840 à1860 lorsque l’émir du Mont-Liban, Béchir II, ambitieux et cruel, s’était allié à Mohamed Ali d’Egypte, lui-même soutenu par la France contre l’alliance anglo-ottomane, afin de mener une entreprise de répression et de désarmement des Druzes, en 1838.

Vingt ans de guerre civile faite de massacres et contre-massacre entre Maronites (soutenus par les Chiites) et Druzes (soutenus par les Ottomans et parfois les Grecs-Orthodoxes) s’ensuivirent.

Plus près de nous, en 1956, c’est avec l’aide du parti phalangiste (pour la première fois représenté à la Chambre par trois députés) que le président Camille Chamoun avait manipulés les lois électorales afin d’assurer l’exclusion du Parlement des dirigeants les plus prestigieux des communautés musulmanes. En même temps, Chamoun avait voulu renforcer ce nouvel ordre politique en cherchant à s’aligner avec les pays du Pacte de baghdad- destiné à endiguer le courant nationaliste de libération arabe inspiré alors par la révolution égyptienne dont l’écho commençait à se faire entendre des populations musulmanes libanaises.

Les résultats de ces manœuvres sont connus. L’union syro – égyptienne permit aux services spéciaux de l’armée syrienne de profiter de l’humiliation des communautés musulmanes libanaises pour encourager et faciliter une guerre civile qui ne prit fin qu’avec l’expiration du Mandat Chamoun (1958) et l’arrivée des forces Amériques de la Sixième – un débarquement qui, recherché par le gouvernement libanais en tant que force de la paix, eut lieu surtout en fonction de la révolution irakienne qui menaçait l’approvisionnement de l’Occident en pétrole.

Après la guerre israélo-arabe, en 1973, alors même que Henry Kissinger initiait le désengagement israélien des territoires égyptien et syrien, des milices privées étaient organisées par les Phalangistes et leurs alliés avec l’appui du président Suleiman Franjié. Plus tard, en 1975, une coalition des trois dirigeants chrétiens- Franjié, Chamoun et Gemayel – engageait un combat militaire avec l’OLP. Pendant deux années de lutte acharnée, et en dépit des efforts entrepris pour convaincre chacune des communautés libanaises (chrétienne et musulmane) que l’objectif de ses refusées à participer à un conflit dont elle ne voulait pas.

Que les Chrétiens aient fait du nationalisme libanais le fondement d’un tel refus de la violence n’est pas surprenant. En minorité dans la région, ils ont toujours considéré un Liban indépendant comme un refuge et un abri sans lequel ils ne peuvent pas survivre et prospérer. Mais du côté des communautés musulmanes également, l’expérience d’une occupation militaire des Syriens et des Palestiniens dans leurs villes et villages les a conduits à accepter une identité nationale libanaise avec une ferveur qui, pour la première fois peut-être dans l’histoire du Liban, peut bien avoir été plus intense que celle des chrétiens. Aussi, en 1981-1982, à la veille d’une invasion israélienne qui s’annonçaient de plus en plus probable et de plus en plus sanglante, les musulmans libanais rejoignaient-ils les Chrétiens libanais dans un effort national destiné à regagner, avant qu’il ne soit trop tard, la souveraineté et l’indépendance de la nation libanaise vis-à-vis des groupes non libanais qui s’y étaient installés.    

Pour le Liban, une politique étranger qui recherche la sécurité des siens au travers d’alliances avec les autres aboutit aux résultats inverses. Comme nous l’avons vu en retraçant brièvement les évènements de 1840-1860, 1958 et 1975-1976, l’alignement et les alliances accentuent les divisions et affectent  l’équilibre constitutionnel des forces politiques et civiles libanaises.

Fort d’une Constitution rédigée en 1926, le Liban s’est développé comme un modèle de démocratie dans le monde arabe : le seul pays à tenir des élections régulièrement, à tolérer le pluralisme des partis politiques, à assurer le changement gouvernemental dans l’ordre constitutionnel et à permettre la croissance économique dans l’esprit de la libre entreprise.

Les manipulations destabilisatrices exercées de l’extérieur ces dernières années ont évidemment affaibli l’image et la performance du Liban. Comment aurait-il pu en être autrement ? Ceux qui ont assuré depuis juin 1976 l’échec dramatique du président Sarkis (élu sur la base d’un compromis syro israélien orchestré par l’intermédiaire des Etats-Unis) sont les mêmes qui, aujourd’hui, se plaignent de la faiblesse du gouvernement central libanais dans le seul but d’appliquer leurs solutions à un pays qu’ils décrivent, en dépit de son histoire, comme ingouvernable.

En fait, l’élément peut-être le plus surprenant et, sans doute le plus encourageant- du calvaire de ces sept dernières années a été la consolidation de la nation libanaise. Soumises aux arbitraires des forces d’occupation multiples, toutes les communautés libanaises se sont unies pour former un nouveau consensus national. Si l’occupation a ainsi permis une nouvelle unité populaire dans des conditions de sécurité territoriale et de souveraineté nationale ne peut alors se trouver qu’au travers de la neutralité.

Ce n’est pas là une solution nouvelle dans l’Histoire. Avec l’accord des puissances intéressées, les Etats faibles situés dans des régions stratégiques vitales ont souvent recherché un tel statut pour garantir leur salut. La neutralité permanente du Liban n’est alors pas seulement le reflet d’un choix mais le résultat d’un besoin national ancré dans l’histoire multi-confessionnelle du pays tout comme dans la nature de son économie de services. Mais même considérée comme un choix mais international ou politique, une neutralité de jure pour le Liban ne fait que confirmer une neutralité de facto effective depuis la guerre israélo-arabe de 1948 :en respectant scrupuleusement les termes de la Convention d’Armistice de 1949, en s’abstenant de toute participation dans les guerres de 1956, 1967 et 1973, et en se refusant à répondre aux provocations militaires israéliennes (y compris les invasions de 1978 et 1982), le Liban a poursuivi une politique de neutralité dont il est en droit de rechercher maintenant une reconnaissance internationale :

1. Le départ de toutes les forces militaires étrangères installées au Liban. Après le départ des forces palestiniennes, seul un retrait mutuel des deux armées d’occupation peut garantir la sécurité réciproque de la Syrie et d’Israël, tout en mettant fin à la fiction selon laquelle l’une est au Liban pour protéger ce pays de l’autre. Du point de  vue de la sécurité d’Israël : un Liban neutre éliminerait tout prétexte à une nouvelle intervention israélienne qui, parce qu’elle risquerait de ne pas être limitée cette fois au territoire libanais, menacerait l’intégrité et l’unité nationale de la Syrie. Et du point de vue de la sécurité des centaines de milliers de Palestiniens vivant encore au Liban , un Liban neutre permettant la protection contre toute persécution militaire et la satisfaction de leurs besoins économiques et humaines en attendant la satisfaction de leurs aspirations nationales légitimes.

3. L’assurance de la non-ingérence de l’une ou de l’autre des puissances régionales dans la vie politique libanaise (au travers de leurs milices respectives et autres formations paramilitaires alliées ou à leur solde) est également requise. Mettre le processus démocratique libanais à l’abri de ces pressions permettrait enfin de dégager les véritables représentants d’un Liban nouveau (au sang politique renouvelé et épuré de leaders corrompus et archaïques) qui servirait d’exemple de cohabitation œcuménique à tout le Proche-Orient.
4. La diplomatie américaine a prouvé qu’elle détenait le monopole du processus de paix israélo-arabe, et cela depuis les pole les négociations de désengagement qui ont suivi la guerre de 1973, en passant par les accords de Camp David et le plan Habib au Liban. Cette diplomatie s’arme du bâton israélien pour offrir la carotte de ce qu’on est convenu d’appeler la soutien à la déclaration de neutralité permanente du Liban proposée par le gouvernement libanais à la communauté internationale et acceptée par les Nations Unies, Ligue Arabe et de ce fait même par les puissances planétaires et régionales concernées.
5. Les forces multinationales pourraient jouer un jouer un double rôle :

1. • Premièrement, assister l’Etat libanais dans l’œuvre délicate de rétablissement de la paix intérieure et notamment le désarmement de toute formation paramilitaire ou de tout individu portant illicitement les armes. Dans un Liban épuisé et révolté par la violence, les pouvoirs publics légitimes doivent avoir le monopole des armes pour assurer un ordre civil s’imposant à toutes les communautés qui constituent la nation libanaise. Au fond, la coexistence des communautés libanaises maronite, sunnite, chiite, grecque orthodoxe, druze, grecque catholique, arménienne et autre ne peut être maintenue par la force armée – même libanaise et bien intentionnée – à moins qu’elle ne bénéficie totalement de la peine crédibilité que seule peut lui procurer la véritable légitimité de l’adhésion, celle qui transcende les querelles en se plaçant au service de l’équité, sans discrimination, ni arrière- pensées.
   • Deuxièmement, veiller à la neutralité absolue des zones frontières libano israélienne et libano syrienne qui sont considérés comme zones vitales de sécurité autant pour le Liban que pour ses voisins belligérants. Les dites zones seraient éventuellement démilitarisées, totalement ou partiellement ; seules des forces multinationales s’y installeraient, acceptables autant par le Liban que par les gouvernements respectifs d’Israël et de la Syrie.

Sauver le Liban pour les autres

C’est en se sauvant des siens et des autres qu’un Liban neutre permettrait également de sauver non seulement les siens mais également les autres. Uni et souverain mais neutre, le Liban pourra retrouver des traditions historiques imposées par des circonstances géographiques dont les limites ont dû être incessamment composées par des ambitions et un rayonnement toujours plus larges : une terre de rencontre dans la tolérance et de coexistence dans l’unité entre différentes communautés religieuses et ethniques ; un dynamisme qui conduit à l’abondance et facilite l’exploitation du potentiel économique et humain infini de toute la région du Proche- Orient ; et un intermédiaire culturel unique entre l’Orient et l’Occident.

Dans le cadre des pays qui l’entourent, un Liban neutre n’en sera pas moins solidaire, par vocation et par choix, du monde arabe sur le plan idéologique, humain et économique. Le Liban et l’ensemble des pays arabes sont voués par la géographie, la culture et l’histoire à un avenir commun. Couper ces liens affecterait dramatiquement le caractère du peuple libanais autant que vitalité de l’économie libanaise, plaçant ainsi le Liban à la merci d’une assistance extérieure qui laisserait le pays moins indépendant et moins viable.

De même, le Liban  neutre serait associé au monde arabe dans la défense de ses causes les plus sacrées, dont celle des droits légitimes du peuple palestinien.

Autrement dit, la seule limite à l’engagement arabe d’un Liban neutre consisterait dans la stricte observation de la neutralité entre belligérants : non-participation à tout acte favorable ou hostile à l’un des adversaires, et interdiction d’accès du territoire libanais à toute armée ou toute formation paramilitaire relevant directement ou indirectement de l’un ou de l’autre des protagonistes.

Au-delà du monde arabe, ni l’établissement d’un protectorat israélien au Liban ni la promotion d’une partition du Liban ne pourraient créer les conditions de sécurité recherchées par ceux–là mêmes qui, en Israël, en Syrie ou ailleurs, préconisent l’une ou l’autre de ces voies tragiques. Au lieu de chercher à imposer sa paix au Liban, le tandem Begin Sharon doit laisser aux Libanais le temps nécessaire au rétablissement de la paix intérieure dans la concorde nationale. Un pouvoir qui repose sur la seule force des armes et sur le seul soutien de minoritaires revanchards est un pouvoir dangereusement fragile.

Le Liban saigne de toute part, ses infrastructures sont détruites, ses institutions éclatées, ses traditions en désuétude ; il a besoin de se retrouver d’abord pour pouvoir redéfinir ensuite une politique régionale crédible, responsable et souveraine.

Israël doit s’estimer satisfait de la paix au Liban et de la neutralisation de ses frontières avec ce pays, jusqu’au jour où  un Liban rétabli, fort de son unité nationale, d’une démocratie revitalisée et assainie, et soutenu par ses alliés naturels du monde arabe, pourra conclure une paix qui ne l’isolera pas de son environnement économique et culturel et qui, pour Israël, sera une paix réelle.

En attendant, la déclaration de la neutralité permanente doit suffire à Israël  pour se retirer de l’intégralité du territoire libanais.

Quant à l’option d’une partition, elle est encore plus dangereuse que celle du protectorat. Une telle partition supposerait en effet la création d’un Etat à prédominance chrétienne et d’un autre à prédominance islamo palestinienne, contre la volonté de la quasi-unanimité des uns et des autres. L’Islam libanais a montré, dans les pires conditions de domination paramilitaire de l’OLP et en dépit de son abandon par ses coreligionnaires arabes, qu’il n’était point disposé à laisser s’implanter quelque pouvoir palestinien que ce soit dans les régions où il se trouve. Les confrontations militaires entres formations musulmanes chiites et sunnites d’une part, et certaines forces de l’OLP d’autre part, qui se sont multipliées ces dix-huit derniers mois ont, de ce point de vue , particulièrement significatives.

Avec la constitution au Liban d’un tel mini-Etat islamo palestinien, Israël se trouverait affronté à une entité hostile qu’aucun élément modérateur ne pourrait contenir avec, comme seule compensation, un autre mini-Etat à prédominance chrétienne dont nous avons déjà discuté les insuffisances.

En bref, l’une ou l’autre de ces fausses options plongeait le Liban dans une guerre civile intercommunautaire qui risquerait de s’étendre rapidement aux pays voisins au travers d’un processus de violence probablement incontrôlable.

Se présentant comme un Français à la recherche de sa conscience nationale après les horreurs de la Deuxième Guerre mondiale, Jules Romains avait voulu retrouver ces « hommes  de bonne volonté » de la génération précédente parmi ceux qui « dans un éclair de lucidité et d’impartialité » auraient enfin compris « les erreurs qu’ils avaient faites et les méfaits qu’ils avaient permis de s’enraciner. »

C’est au travers de ce « supplément de conscience », pour employer la phrase de Bergson, qu’Albert Camus avait découvert dans les années de résistance à l’occupation allemande la détermination du peuple français de «  revire le cours de toute son histoire », car – avait-il ajouté plus tard- « nous tous, parmi les ruines, préparons une renaissance ».

De même, le Liban, aujourd’hui, peut trouver au terme de la période la plus difficile et la plus meurtrière de son histoire l’occasion de relever victorieusement le défi de l’avenir. Enrichi à l’infini par un passé qui a vu ses rivages traversé, depuis l’ancienne Phénicie, par les civilisations les plus glorieuses de leur temps. Le Liban se doit, et doit aux autres, de préparer sa renaissance. Son succès contribue à la consolidation au Proche-Orient d’un environnement propice à la coexistence des trois grandes religions : le Judaïsme, l’Islam et le Christianisme.

Mais son échec serait également celui de toute la région qui borde la Méditerranée, une région menacée par des conflits multiples qui, d’escalade en escalade, prennent de plus en plus l’allure de croisades religieuses. De la dynamique effarante de la guerre irako iranienne aux ressentiments crées par les guerres israélo-arabes, il est grand temps que la conscience internationale fasse enfin entendre son refus.  

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INTERVENTIONS – INTERVIEWS – ANALYSES

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Extraits de «minutes » d’une conférence sur la neutralité du Liban intitulée  « The Challenge of Lebanon » organisée à la Chambre des Représentants à Washington en mai 1982 (ENG)

Hon. Paul N. Mc CLOSKEY, JR. Of CALIFORNIA IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES Tuesday, May 18, 1982

Mr. Mc CLOSKEY. Mr. Speaker, as the Israeli-Palestinian cease-fire hangs by a thread, the tragedy of Lebanon continues. The challenge to the United States is how to help in restoring stability to this lovely place until the Palestinians have a homeland.

One of the most insightful articles I have read one subject, “The challenge of Lebanon,” was recently published by Roger Edde, the Deputy Secretary General of the Lebanese National Bloc. Mr. Edde asks for what would ordinarily seem a simple posture by the United States : that we make a commitment to their territorial integrity and overall security at least equal to that we extend to Israel.

Why Not? It would seem to me that Lebanon’s 3 million people are as entitied to U.S. friendship as are the 3 ½ million people of Israel.

The fact is that the Palestinian Liberation organization is headquartered in Lebanon; and that Lebanon , as a nation, is powerless to control the PLO, should not mitigate our traditional respect and friendship for the rights of the Lebanese people.

Clearly a new U.S. initiative in the Mideast is needed if we are to restore the process begun at Camp David.

I commend Mr. Edde’s article as an appropriate reference in our search for a new initiative to the peace negotiations.

INTERVENTION DE ROGER EDDE « THE CHALLENGE OF LEBANON »

PART I : There is in Lebanon Today a new political consensus…

…that calls for policies of national renewal organized around a political leader able to save the country from its prevailing turmoil .Uniting Moslems and Christians ,if such a consensus were given a chance ,would assert itself in the forthcoming presidential elections, now scheduled to be held in July 1982.Yet, as paramilitary factions continue to blackmail the Lebanese people, The international community often ignores this political consensus, and neglects to provide the support Lebanon’s national leaders and representatives deserve.

Peace in the Middle East  can only come a piece at a time .The Experience of the past many Years has shown that a comprehensive solution in the area  must be sought one step at a time .However tedious the process may appear to be at times, keeping up a momentum for peace helps avoid war. A lack of progress quickly leads to despair and, inevitably, to a renewed cycle of violence to provide and sustain such momentum, the leadership which was assumed several years ago by the United States remains, of course, vital. A holocaust in Lebanon has occurred, perhaps all too conveniently, as of the most tragic and deplorable side effects of an erratic search for peace in the region. Yet, together with other moderate Arab states common economic, political, and strategic objectives which are not incompatible with the long-term interests of Israel as well.

Concerned over the rise of subversive influence in the area, Lebanon supports now as before a negotiated settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict .Clearly, it deserves a U.S. Commitment to its territorial integrity and overall security at least equal to that extended to Israel.

In 1981, the Reagan administration uncovered, in the words of Secretary of State, Alexander M. Haig, the “interrelationship which developed between the situation in Lebanon and the Peace process” in the Middle East. The Early Declarations of the Reagan Admistration appeared to make Lebanon a priority of its Middle East policy. Yet, the actions that were subsequently launched reflected the continued U.S unwillingness to overcome the tacit alliance that has developed between Israel and Syria over the control of Lebanon.

Thus, The United States has often failed to take into account the consequences of its policies in the region on Lebanon Proper .In 1976, Syria entered into Lebanon under conditions secretly negotiated with Israel through the intermediary of the then secretary of State, Henry Kissinger. surprisingly Kissinger apparently assumed that Assad’s Syria could eventually control the PLO ,and with Jordan quickly emerge as the main U.S interlocutor in the unfolding peace process . With the approval of Israel, the Syrians were said to rescue the Israeli-backed phalangists against the counter –offensive launched in Mount Lebanon by the PLO and the leftist Lebanese factions, thus leaving Syria with the startling role of the “peace Keeper” in a country over which its ambitions have been such that no Syrian regime in Damascus has ever agreed to an exchange of ambassador. in 1976,the presidential elections held in Beirut reflected the informal entente between Damascus and Tel Aviv, an entente that Washington hoped to manipulate but of which it soon Became the hostage ,and Lebanon the victim.

In 1977-1981, the Limits of Syria’s credibility were quickly exposed. Not a participant in the camp David process, Damascus soon provided support for Iran against Iraq confirming further its growing isolation from the rest of the Arab World .In the fall 1980, its isolation was completed when Syrian president Hafez al –Assad signed a treaty of friendship and defense with the Soviet Union in the aftermath of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.

Later, in the spring of 1981, the missile crisis between Israel and Syria permitted an effective manipulation of U.S diplomacy. By engaging in such an artificial confrontation at the very time when Secretary of State Alexander M. Haig Was Promoting his vision of an anti-Soviet consensus in the region, both begin and Assad forced a reappraisal of U.S Priorities as Philip Habib engaged in shuttle diplomacy meant to end the “crisis” by endorsing a status quo (Syrian and Israeli control over Lebanon) that was the source of the true crisis.

Finally, in 1981-1982, whatever remained of Syria’s status in the region was ended as internal developments revealed the domestic vulnerability of Assad’s regime. By Then Damascus influence on the PLO could only be negative: it could prevent the Palestinian leadership from participating in any diplomatic effort aimed at the resolution of conflict, but it could not lead that leadership to that path. Thus, When the Fahd Plan Was proposed, Syria successfully blocked PLO chief Yasser Arafat’s effort to secure the PLO’s endorsement of a plan that implied the recognition of Israel in return for the creation of a Palestinian State in the Territories occupied by Israel in 1967.

PART II : With the negotiations on …

…Palestinian autonomy stalled, the Syrian Golan Heights annexed by Israel, and new outbursts of Israeli repression on the West Bank and in Gaza, it has become increasingly  clear that the initial phase of the Camp David process has now been completed .Whether or not I will resume remains to be seen. In the meantime, however, the fear of a major Israeli-Arab war that would begin on Lebanese territory has become a cause for serious concern in Washington and in Arab capitals. Adopted in March, 1978, Following the Israeli forces , restoring the withdrawal of Israeli invasion of South Lebanon , U.N Security Council Resolutions 425 and 426 aimed at “ confirming the withdrawal of Israeli Forces, restoring international peace and security ,and Assisting the government of Lebanon in ensuring the return of its effective authority in the area.”

In Addition, the Security Council called on all parties to “respect… the territorial integrity, sovereignty and political independence of Lebanon within its internationally recognized boundaries.” Not surprisingly, neither Israel, Syria nor the PLO has cooperated in achieving goals which are tantamount to an actual neutralization of South Lebanon if not, Ultimately, The Whole of Lebanon.

In The political diaries of Moshe Sharret it is clear that in 1984 Israel planned the destabilization of Lebanon through the manipulation of some of its Maronites in Order to take over the waters of the Litani River. More recently, since the start of the Lebanese Turmoil in 1975-1976, Israel and Syria have repeatedly agreed to their respective involvement in Lebanese affairs, thus underming Lebanese sovereignty in such a way as to use Lebanon as a launching pad for their designs there and elsewhere. North of the Litani River, this surprising but tacit alliance between these two “enemy-partners” brought about Syria’s de facto annexation of 80% of Lebanon’s territory within which the phalangists (linked to both Israel and Syria) received a measure of local control over a tiny territorial enclave .South of the Litani River, the area invaded by the Israel in 1978 was shared among the Israelis and the Haddad –led southern phalangists, UNIFEL and the PLO.

This informal entente between Damascus and Tel Aviv survived the 1978 bombing of the Palestinian camps in South Lebanon ( a ceasefire between Israel and the This informal entente between Damascus  and tel Aviv survived the 1978 bombing   of the Christian city in zahlé , as it did the bombing of the PLO headquarters in Beirut and of the Palestinian Camps in South Lebanon (a ceasefire between Israel and the PLO was then negotiated by presidential envoy Philip Habib with the assistance of Saudi Arabia ).

Only the requirements of electoral politics in the case of Israel , and of Arab money-politics in the case of Syria ,brought about the appearance of a confrontation between the two countries in the spring of 1981.

To save Lebanon demands a strong and charismatic leader able to mobilize the nation and remain invulnerable to any challenge, political or otherwise, launched by the many armed factions within the Country

Finally, in its war with Iraq, Iran has enjoyed the open support of Syria and the more discreet, but quite effective military assistance of Israel. Significantly enough, cooperation between the Lebanese factions sponsored by Tehran, Damascus and Tel Aviv has been simultaneously increased, there by leading to new and violent confrontations with the Lebanese and Palestinian left.

As we now move closer to a new Israeli military strike in Lebanon, the contradictions between the objectives pursued by Washington on the one hand, Damascus and Tel Aviv on the other, become even more significant.

The consequences of such a strike would be considerable. In Lebanon proper, hundreds of thousands of desperate refugees will pour into northern areas with nothing to lose and seeking revenge for their tragic losses from whomever they can. in so doing , they will  set in motion a self-destructive dynamic that may end Lebanon’s last chance of recovery ,and deny the hopes placed in next July’s presidential elections . This will in turn confirm the worst fears of the Lebanese: that in 1982, as in 1976, the elections of a president will be the result of a compromise between Syrian and Israeli preferences, thereby preventing the selection of the choice of the real majority of the Lebanese people.

A new military invasion of Israel in South Lebanon would facilitate the radicalization of moderate Arabs, ranging from Egypt to some elements of the PLO. And, perhaps worst of all, it may help generate a new wave of anti-Americanism and Islamic fanaticism a la Khomeini among the 700 million Moslems in the world, reaching as far as Pakistan and Turkey. Thus, if the rise of the PLO proved to be the logical outcome of the Arab humiliation suffered during the Six day war in 1967, the spread of uncontainable Islamic fanaticism may well prove to be the result of further Israeli adventurism in 1982.

While helpful, the recent 1,000 man increase of UNIFIL forces was voted by the Security Council with the approval of the United States in Order to fill the Gap which allows the Israelis and the Palestinians to infiltrate Lebanese territory without confronting the U.N. Peace –Keeping forces. Such measures however, hardly permit the full implementation of the original U.N. mandate. Yet, a forceful and determined approach of the United States could have made then, and could still make now, the difference, and secure, at last, the withdrawal of Israeli and Syrian forces from Lebanon.

Liberated from the “protection” extended by 30,000 Syrian forces, the moderate leadership within the PLO would be less sensitive to rejectionist pressures exerted by Syria and Marxist-oriented factions. the restoration of the sovereignty of the Lebanese government over Lebanese territory would therefore ,reinforce the PLO’s commitment to the ceasefire .Israel and The PLO would be denied the foremost channel of confrontation open to them since the early 1970s with the Syrian forces in Lebanon replaced by an international or multinational peace –keeping force. Instead they may then find it possible to use diplomatic channels for peaceful engagement.

There can hardly be any stable peace between the Arab States and Israel without reconciliation between the Israeli people and the Palestinian people. Indeed, no separate peace with any one Arab country will last, let alone suffice, so long as an agreement with the Palestinians has not been worked out and implemented the predictable evolution of Egypt’s policies after the April 25 deadline is a case in point. Egypt’s return in the Arab World will not merely result from a change in its leadership, from Anwar el-Sadat to Hosni Mubarak. It reflects instead the gap that prevailed throughout the Camp David process between the frustrated commitment of the Egyptian people to Arab solidarity of which the Palestinian cause is the minimal expression, and the rejection of that cause by the Israeli leadership.

Now, it is time for an Israeli leader, too, to do the unthinkable, and, like Sadat, risk an initiative that would at last overcome the remaining psychological barriers that divide the Israelis and the Palestinian people. Once this reconciliation has taken place, other Arab States will inevitably follow. Israel will then be integrated in a region of which it will have finally become a real component and within which it will have finally achieved its long-term security.

PART III : To save Lebanon demands…

…a strong and charismatic leader able to mobilize the nation and remain invulnerable to any challenge, political or otherwise, launched by the many armed factions within the country. The dynamic of national renewal would restore the morale of the Lebanese army, and renew its mandate to re-affirm the national sovereignty and protect the territorial integrity of Lebanon.

This may not have been possible before these seven years of turmoil and suffering from the domination of divided, irrational, greedy, and self-centered factions that left both Moslems and Christians weary of the rhetoric and the politics of the “warriors”. The people of Lebanon are now ready to die for their flag, their democratic system, and their traditional values. They are coming back to their roots, seeking their country’s survival, their dignity, and their individual freedom and human rights.

For too long, the paramilitary factions have taken advantage of the vacuum created by a paralyzed Lebanese authority to share the spoils of war and increase their mercenary incomes. Ultimately, their foremost objective is to prevent the restoration of Lebanese sovereignty, and keep any central government in Beirut from enforcing a minimum of national discipline. Indeed, the reverse would have been surprising, as national unity can only take place at the expense of the very privileges these factions have violently stolen from the nation.

The PLO can not escape the exasperation of both Lebanese Moslems and Christians with the influence and violence of the paramilitary factions. This is especially significant. Aware of such trends, moderate PLO leaders have privately expressed their concern about the growing hostility of the Moslem communities in Lebanon toward them. Ever since the arrival of the first Palestinian refugees in the late 1940s, the Lebanese (Christians and Moslems alike) have endorsed the Palestinian cause. Long before the PLO came into being, every Lebanese president and diplomat has argued the Palestinian case before the world community. When PLO chief Yasser Arafat was received at the General Assembly of the United Nations, he was introduced by Maronite Lebanese president, Suleiman Franjieh. As for the Moslem Lebanese, their dedication to every Arab and Palestinian issue has been unconditional and passionate. Whenever there has been conflict between the objectives of the PLO and the national interest of Lebanon; the Lebanese Moslems have forcefully shown their solidarity with the Palestinians.

In 1969-1970, as the PLO forces were beginning to settle in Lebanon with an armed contingent of hardly more than 200 men, the Lebanese National Bloc repeatedly underlined the risks of a paramilitary force which would escape the control of the Lebanese government. This, it was argued at the time, would provide Israel with the pretext for retaliatory or preventive strikes, at first against the PLO, but ultimately in order to satisfy its historical designs on the waters of the Litani River.

As the leader of the National Bloc, Raymond Edde campaigned relentlessly to gain support of other Moslem and Christian Leaders for his proposal to deploy U.N. forces in Southern Lebanon along the only internationally recognized borders between Israel and any of its neighbors. Although such forces were already in place between Israel and its two main adversaries, Egypt and Syria, no other Christian leader – Whether Pierre Gemayel, Camille Chamoun or Suleiman Franjieh – agreed to endorse Edde’s proposal because they did not want to lose whatever Moslem support they sought at the time.

Nor was any Moslem leader any more willing to support this peace initiative. Despite a nearly unanimous agreement among the Christian and Moslem leaders that Raymond Edde’s proposal would protect Lebanon from being sucked into the quicksand of the Arab-Israeli conflict, the proposal was ignored.

Confrontation between the PLO’s military and administrative build-up and the Lebanese army began in 1969, one year before Jordan forced the Palestinians out and left them with a democratic and vulnerable Lebanon as their most accessible refuge in the Arab World. At that time, the Lebanese army could have defeated the PLO’s rising power. But, given the solidarity extended to the Palestinians by the Moslem communities and pressure from other Arab countries, and with a presidential election scheduled for the summer of 1970, army action was restrained. Instead, the main objective of the second Bureau that led the Lebanese army at the time, was to ensure the election of any “shehabist” candidate who would guarantee their survival.

In November 1969, the Cairo Agreement that was signed between General Boustani and Yasser Arafat made such unbelievable concessions on Lebanese sovereignty that it astonished its sponsor, President Nasser. Later, a government that included the phalangist and Chamoun parties had the Cairo agreement approved by a parliament which was not even aware of its content. Once again, the Lebanese National Bloc warned and voted against and accord that gave the PLO the right to establish a state within the Lebanese state, and operate on Lebanese territory without any regard for the legitimate authority of the Lebanese government.

With a strong and united Lebanon able to discourage expansionist designs against its territory or its sovereignty, the Lebanese people will have a chance to play, once again, their historic role as mediator, not only in the economic field, but also in politics, culture, and elsewhere.

Following the 1973 War, as Kissinger was initiating the Israeli disengagement from Egyptian and Syrian territories, private militias were organized by the Phalangists and their allies with the covert support of President Franjieh. Subsequently, in 1975, a coalition of three Christian leaders-franjieh, Chamoun, and Gemayel-engaged in a military challenge of the PLO.

During two years of fierce fighting, the Moslem community withstood the pressure of the PLO and its leftist allies to participate in the conflict. From without, Syria’s president Hafez al-Assad played one side against the other, maintaining a close and sustained dialogue with Franjieh and the phalangist militias on the one hand, and feeding the confrontation through its control of the Al Saiqa and the Syrian-backed Lebanese Baath faction on the other.

Deceived into believing that the order side was about to exterminate them, the Christian and Moslem Lebanese communities were used in a conflict, which they did not understand, and which most of them refused to enter. The Christians, not surprisingly, made Lebanese nationalism the foundation of their rejection of such violence. As a minority in the area, they have always considered an independent Lebanon as a refuge and a shelter without which they cannot survive in the region. But, even more significantly, as the Moslem communities experienced Syrian and Palestinian military rule in their towns and villages, they too have come to embrace Lebanon’s national identity to a point which for the first time in their history, may well be even more intensely left than by the Christians. Today, therefore, the Lebanese Moslems can play a vital role in helping the country regain its sovereignty and its independence as it resists any non-Lebanese, including Syria and the PLO.

Lebanon’s future does not demand depend on a confrontation with the Syrian army or the PLO. In truth, both Syria and the PLO have strategic and economic interests in Lebanon, and as Lebanon has in Syria and with the PLO. No side in this relationship has any interest in a violent conflict; indeed, they have all lost in the Lebanese war. It is now time to resolve existing differences and secure the freedom, economic interests, and security needs of all the parties involved.

The Lebanese, the Palestinians, and the Syrians are preordained by geography, culture, and history to a cooperative future in which they share risks and opportunities alike. Clearly, with a strong and united Lebanon able to discourage expansionist designs against its territory or its sovereignty, the Lebanese people will have a chance to play, once again, their historic role as mediator, not only in the economic field, but also in politics, culture, and elsewhere.

But to do so, what is needed first and foremost is a strong national leadership which embodies a national consensus that, despite repeated attempts to dismantle it, has not only survived, but even matured over the past seven years.

PART IV : The Lebanese crisis is an international problem.

Even the presidential elections now scheduled for next July may well require the presence of an international commission that would guarantee its procedures. The fact that this may be the case shows the limits that are placed by Syria and Israel on Lebanon’s sovereignty.

Most urgently, the international community should help achieve the withdrawal of Israeli and Syrian forces from Lebanon, and successfully prevent an Israeli invasion through the implementation of U.N. Security council resolutions 425, 426, 450, 459, and 490. This would entail the replacement of Syria’s “war-keeping” forces with an international peace force that would include the participation of the United States and a number of European States, as well as those moderate Arab states without expansionist design over Lebanon. Without such international initiatives, the “Iranization” of the whole area is likely to follow. With regard to Lebanon specifically, this would mean the destruction of an ancient, prosperous, multi-de-nominational, and western-oriented democracy where Jews, Christians and Moslems coexist without discrimination.

A strong national leadership in Lebanon would impose its own discipline on the PLO, and deny it the use of Lebanese territory in ways that conflict with Lebanon’s own interests. By limiting the PLO’s behavior within Lebanon, such a leadership would also strengthen the hand of the Palestinian moderates who are now ready to face the hard challenges of peace against the ideologues whose interests lie elsewhere, in Marxist-inspired dogmas and subversion. In no case would the international peace-keeping force need to police a domestic order which the Lebanese army itself can easily preserve. Well equipped and well led, the Lebanese army, which now numbers 30,000 men, would be the dominant military force in the country. It now merely lacks the morale credibility, and national support a popular leader would quickly provide.

The Lebanese social, economic, and cultural infrastructure have endured seven years of intense and constant turmoil during which they have miraculously managed to prosper. This alone should be enough to convince the policy makers of friendly nations that Lebanon can and must be helped to regain its sovereignty and restore peace. Saving Lebanon requires the expression of renewed Lebanese nationalism. But, it also needs the assistance of a decisive and visionary U.S. leadership that reflects the will of an international community ready, at last, to meet the challenge of Lebanon.

 

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FOR A NEUTRAL LEBANON BY ROGER EDDE Opinion . Commentary. the Baltimore Sun, Washington, Friday, july 23,1982 (ENG)

For some time now, it has been increasingly clear that any further progress in the peace process in the Middle East is irreversibly tied to a stable and lasting resolution of the question of Lebanon. In turn, the resolution of this question depends on the re-establishment of a Lebanese sovereignty that was, many years ago, literally stolen from the Lebanese people by foreign forces.

All too conveniently the absence of a strong central government in Beirut has been explained as the logical outcome of a fragmented nation embroiled in an impossible civil war involving its many religious and political factions. Such an analysis has overlooked the interest of non-Lebanese forces in encouraging and providing arms for such conflicts in order to justify their own presence and their respective designs in and over Lebanon. Far from causing an irreversible dismemberment of that unfortunate country, the holocaust of the past seven years has strengthened the resolve of the various Lebanese communities to survive as one people within the inviolable boundaries of a democratic and multi-denominational state.

Beyond the daily headlines, a first imperative in the negotiations on Lebanon is therefore  to break away from the false and self-serving assumption that Lebanon is hopelessly divided within itself. A strong leadership in Beirut does not require a violent leader nor does it entail the need for a repressive army. These can only lead to further divisions and bring about a state of semi-permanent civil war. Instead, a strong leadership for Lebanon means a leader who enjoys the confidence of all the communities that comprise the country.

A second imperative in these negotiations is to move away from short-term solutions, and act boldly and quickly toward more radical alternatives which provide security for all states in the region while insuring the unity and sovereignty of Lebanon itself. Such objectives would be met most effectively if Lebanon were to be made a permanently neutral and disarmed state.

Neutrality for Lebanon is a realism of last resort. Not so much the result of a new wisdom as the consequence of evident failure, it is a policy dictated by the country’s historical fact, its geographical situation and its political tradition.

The historical fact of Lebanon is such that alignment abroad risks disintegration at home. Only the neutralization and the disarmament of the country would put an end to the tangle of terrorism and violence which has already produced too many innocent victims.

Placed at the geographical heart of a region in a state of war since 1948, Lebanon – which signed an armistice agreement with Israel that formally recognized the existing boundaries between the two countries – could, with neutrality and disarmament, escape the cycle of international conflicts of which it has been made a pawn over the past many years.

And finally, once disarmed and neutral, Lebanon could once again become an example for the whole region of political democracy, cultural pluralism and peaceful coexistence among its many spiritual communities.

While postwar precedents for such solutions to the predicament of states placed in a buffer area do not abound, they do exist. Thus, in 1955 – with the approval of the Soviet Union and in the space of only a few weeks – Austria escaped the East-West conflict in Central Europe by committing itself to permanent neutrality when it signed the peace treaty that put a formal end to its part in World War II. Unlike such practitioners of armed neutrality as Sweden and Switzerland,. Austria was left only with a small army whose sole function was to maintain order within the country. Austria nevertheless preserved institutions and sympathies that have kept it clearly on the side of the West.

Such are the aspirations of today’s Lebanon which, like yesterday’s Austria, has not been declared a belligerent state in the wars which have brought the Middle East to its current state of turmoil.

In short, a permanently neutral and disarmed Lebanon would require:

1. The total departure of all foreign forces now in the country, and the complete disarmament of all paramilitary groups now within the internationally recognized boundaries of Lebanon; a restructured Lebanese Army would be left with the role of an effective national police force.
2. The guarantee of the Great Powers, and the establishment on its soil of a multinational force, acceptable to all concerned parties.
3. The enforcement of true democratic procedures which, at last freed from the pressures exerted by foreign and local armed forces and factions, would permit the election of a credible Lebanese leadership for a united free Lebanon.

Roger Edde, a Lebanese lawyer, is the founding president of the Neutral Lebanon Movement he has been in Washington on consultations.

 

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THE CASE FOR LEBANESE NEUTRALITY Analyse signée par le chercheur Claude Khoury parue dans les pages «Politique Internationale » du Monday Morning (ENG)

The Israeli invasion of Lebanon has given birth to a new Lebanese movement which has already established its presence in major American and European cities and is trying to reach the top decision-makers of Lebanon, the west, the Soviet Bloc and the Arab World.

The “Neutral Lebanon Movement” is pushing for Austrian- style neutrality which would pull Lebanon out of the Arab-Israeli conflict without costing it its Arab identity and extricate it from the East-West Struggle without sacrificing its status as a member of the free world.

The Founder of the new movement, international business Lawyer Roger Edde, is the deputy secretary of the Lebanese National Bloc, the party headed by the Member of Parliament Raymond Edde.

But the emphasizes that the National Bloc has nothing to do with the Neutral Lebanon Movement. He is hoping to get the party to adopt the neutrality policy before the end of 1983, he says, but the movement is lobbying the National Bloc just as it is lobbying the rest of Lebanon’s many political clusters.

In Beirut for a brief visit last week, Roger Edde explained to me the neutrality goal as he and his movement have been presenting it in private meetings, seminars, panel discussions, lectures and interviews in the Arab World, Europe and the United States for the past four months : 

MADE IN AUSTRIA

The movement, he said, was preaching Austrian-type neutrality because it wanted Lebanon to remain a member of the U.N. and the Arab league and part of the free world.

“Austria’s neutrality has allowed it to remain in the United Nations despite the fact that U.N. decisions can be made by majority vote” he said. “It has faced situations where it could not apply U.N. decisions – like sanctions resolutions, for instance – without putting its neutrality in question. Because of the Austrian precedent, it is now understood that the U.N.- or any other international or regional body- recognizes a neutral country’s right not to apply decisions which could be perceived ad contrary to its pledge of neutrality. Lebanon should seek that kind of status at the U.N.

“Austria has also remained part of the western free world and has a special agreement with the European economic community- an agreement which is in fact purely economic and has nothing to do with political neutrality. In other words, the Soviet Union.

Didn’t insist that neutral Austria be ideologically neutral, and the Soviet Union was one the  key factors in the neutrality of Austria negotiated the question with Moscow  before it negotiated it with Washington.

“In the same way, we would like Lebanon to remain not only part of the free world but also- and more so-part of the Arab World, committed to Arab solidarity and Arab causes, ideologically free to keep in the region and in the world’s geopolitics.

It is easier for a neutral Lebanon to maintain is membership in the Arab League than it is to remain in the U.N. Edde believes, “ because unlike the U.N., the Arab League takes its decision by unanimity, not by majority.

“And a neutral Lebanon is not obliged to be economically neutral” Edde Said. “In other words, it would remain committed to the boycott of Israel imposed by the Arab World as long as the Arab World, on which 80 percent of the Lebanese economy depends, maintains that boycott.”

Austria secured its neutrality by signing bilateral agreements with the powers concerned, but Lebanon should go a step further, he added.

 “ We should have our neutrality established through the endorsement of the U.N. Security Council, because that would allow as to  have our neutrality recognized even by countries with which we have no diplomatic relation, like Israel. A unanimous or majority endorsement of Lebanese neutrality by the Security Council without Israeli opposition would be a de facto Israeli recognition of Lebanese neutrality. The U.N. needs to play this role, if only to enhance its image as international peace – maker – an image which suffered a setback when Israel invaded Lebanon, ignoring the U.N.’s moral presence in the South.”

In addition to Security Council endorsement of its neutrality, Lebanon could sign “Conventions of protection” with various international powers committed to this neutrality, Edde said. “We could, for instance, sign conventions of neutrality with each of the countries which are supplying Lebanon with peace-keeping forces. The conventions could be signed before these peace-keeping forces leave the country, keeping in mind that they must not leave before Lebanese sovereignty is fully reestablished and the Lebanese army is once more the only military power in Lebanon- an army disciplined and strong enough to dissuade any regional power which could challenge our neutrality.”

So far, Edde said, the call for a neutral Lebanon had drawn “positive reactions” from some Arab and European states. He singled out France as the European state from which his movement has received the most favorable response: “In France, I was told at the very top level that    neutrality may be the only solution for Lebanon.” And where the Arab world was concerned, he pointed out, the Egyptian government “Has been going out of its way to talk openly about the necessity of neutralizing Lebanon.”

THE ARAB POSITION

It was noteworthy, he said, “that so far, I have not had any negative reactions from any of the Arab countries concerned, like Syria or Saudi Arabia.

As for the Palestine Liberation organization, it should have no objections to a neutral Lebanon. “The PLO leaders have repeatedly said that they have definitely given up the idea of using Lebanese land for any military activities against Israel. They have said this to the Lebanese government, I have heard from reliable and high-ranking PLO leaders, and we have to consider this pledge as serious and sincere. There is no question that a neutral Lebanon cannot allow the PLO to maintain any military force in Lebanon or to use Lebanon land to strike against Israel or any other country”.

Regarding current Palestinian presence in Lebanon, Edde said special efforts were needed to settle that matter.

 “Lebanon must by all means help the Palestinians to have their rights recongnized, to have an identity and a state of their own. However, we must recognize the fact that we have a number of Palestinians to have little chance to go and live in Palestinian land – in Israel, in Jordan, in the West Bank. This is a problem that the Lebanon alone cannot resolve; it must be solved in a realistic approach in coordination with our fellow Arabs.

“To begin with, we must give these Palestinians a feeling of security. We should not forget that the Israelis are now trying to convince the Palestinians living under their occupation in South Lebanon that Israel is their only protector and is in a better position than any Arab country to give them a decent life – housing, social rights, economic rights. Israel may be able to manipulate these Palestinians with the carrot and stick policy, and we should not be surprised if after a while Israel starts saying, “I’m staying in South Lebanon to protect the Palestinians who asked for my protection”.

That would be a disaster for the Palestinian and Arab world. We must therefore study the question of Palestinian presence very seriously : how to give them security, how to secure their social and economic rights, how to help them join their families elsewhere in the Middle East and live in acceptable economic and social conditions as they wait for the day when they will hopefully cease to be refugees.

It was true, Edde said, that neither the Palestinians nor any Arab state had come out enthusiastically in favor of Arab neutrality, but this could be partly due to the fact that the Lebanese government it self had not adopted a position on the subject. At any rate, absence of “aggressive Arab support “for the idea could be counter-productive at this point, since it would probably stiffen Israeli resistance to Lebanese neutrality and weaken the American ability to influence Israel on that matter, should America decide to try.

But whether the Arabs had discovered the benefits of a neutral Lebanon or not at this point, a neutral Lebanon would be a boon for the Arab world, he said, summarizing the advantages the Arab world would reap from Lebanese neutrality as follows:” If Lebanon is declared neutral, the Arabs will lose nothing, but they will recuperate an Arab country from Israeli occupation or direct Israeli influence. And Lebanon is an Arab country.

A quasi-majority of the Lebanese have Arab feelings of identity, and Lebanese neutrality would further strengthen Arab-Lebanese ties by eliminating the fears of some of Lebanon’s minorities. Neutrality would reassure the Lebanese minorities, specifically the Maronite minority, who have been living in fear of forced Arab unity – a Greater Syria unity, for instance.

This reassurance would certainly help the Maronites to be more open and forthcoming in their Arab identification and reduce the chances of success for an isolationist trend. What we would have then would be a free, stable Arab Lebanon, and the Arabs would certainly prefer such a Lebanon to one which is unstable and always on the defensive towards them.

A neutral Lebanon would give the Arabs back their forum, their meeting place of refuge that Lebanon used to be. It would also relieve the Arabs of the financial responsibility of helping Lebanon rebuild itself: the dynamics of peace and stability of neutrality would attract Arab and international capital to Lebanon, which would spare the Arabs the need to subsidize this country’s reconstruction.

“Furthermore, a neutral Lebanon would be an example for the Arab world to follow. If neutrality is successful in Lebanon, it could be enlarged to cover the entire region, a region which could spark World War III – because of the importance of oil and because of the emotional and political links between Israel and the United States.

 “As we see it today, the Soviet design appears to be to move towards a share of this region’s oil by exploiting the Iranian-Iraqi conflict, perhaps by dismantling Iran through infiltration of the Toudeh Party and through its influence in Baluchistan, Azerbaidjian and some of the kurds, and by using the using  the Iranien revolution as a regional destabilizing factor. The risk of an East-West confrontation is not imminent, in my opinion, but it should not be exclude in the future. If there is one region in the world where the superpowers could clash one day that region is the Middle-East. The only solution that could avert that is a neutral Middle-East.

“Neutrality would also allow the region to develop economically. The Arab decline which was brought on by 400 years of Ottoman rule has not ended yet; no renaissance is possible in the Arab world as long as the pressure of the Israeli-Arab and Iranian-Iraqi wars is maintained.

Those, Edde said, were the benefits the Arabs could reap from Lebanese neutrality, and they were all the more overwhelming because they were not balanced by any disadvantages. It was not true, for instance, that a neutral Lebanon would become “Israel’s gateway to the Arab world.”

“Israel’s gateway to the Arab world is without question the West Bank and Jordan – certainly not Lebanon. Israel is bound to use its Arabs, and not the Lebanese, as intermediaries with the Arab would, because Lebanon is Israel’s natural competitor. In fact, Lebanon must start preparing it self as of now for Israeli competition in the Arab world. We have to prepare to meet Israel’s agricultural and industrial challenge if we want to maintain our economic position in the area. And we have to prepare to meet Israel’s educational challenge as well: the American university of Beirut is lagging 10 to 15 years behind the times, especially in the management and technological fields, and the other Lebanese universities are far behind AUB.”

Considering this Lebanese-Israeli rivalry and Israel’s reported designs on Lebanon, why, I asked, would Israel support – or not oppose – a Lebanese bid for neutrality? 

THE ISRAELI FACTOR

“If Lebanese neutrality is internationally guaranteed,  and if its is accompanied by demilitarized Syrian- Lebanese and Israeli- Lebanese borders controlled by multi-national forces acceptable to Lebanon, Israel and Syria, it would give Israel the security it wants on its northern borders”,  Edde said.

“A Neutral Lebanon could by Israel’s way out of the possible Vietnamization of its involvement in Lebanon. Israel is taking risks in the quagmire of Lebanon’s internal politics. The Israeli may be sure of the themselves no, but they cannot be sure of the future, especially if there is a new Soviet Policy to turn Lebanon into Israel’s Vietnam. If a situation develops that forces Israel to mobilize 60,000 or 100,000 in Lebanon, instead of 30,000, and if large numbers of Israelis begin to be killed, no Israeli government can survive; Israel would be forced to withdraw on shameful conditions, as the U.S. withdrew from Vietnam.

“I don’t want to sound optimistic about this sort of thing. We as Arabs, should not go around speculating that we are capable to turning Lebanon into Israel’s Vietnam, because it is equally possible that Israel would use such a situation to go further than it has, occupy all of Lebanon threaten the unity and stability of Syria, Israel must consider, however. That there is a fifty-fifty risk that its involvement in Lebanon will be very costly for its government and its people.”

But the signals Edde has been getting through American diplomatic channels indicate that Israel would be opposed to the neutral Lebanon proposition.

“I have had serious discussions with the U.S. government on this subject, and the first reaction coming from Israel through diplomatic channels was negative, because Israel wants to impose a peace linked to a protectorate agreement with Lebanon, “he said.

Part of the Neutral Lebanon Movement’s lobbying effort has been directed at U.S. “think tanks where American Jews are very actively working to influence the policy- making of the U.S. government.” Judging by those contacts, Edde says that liberal Jews appear to favor the neutral Lebanon idea, but hardliners reject it out of hand.

 “I hade very positive reactions from liberal circles – those know to be closer to the Israeli Labor Party and the Peace Now Movement,” he said, we have had no chance of scoring anything with the hardliners of the Amos perlmutter kind, whose position is the position of begin and Sharon: peace now with another Lebanon on Israeli terms.”

Edde said the establishment of the neutral Lebanon Movement was his answer to Israelis withdrawal-for-peace barter proposal to Lebanon. “The answer, in effect, is that the Israelis asked for security, and they got security; they are asking for peace in Lebanon, and they will get peace I Lebanon, but not forced peace with Lebanon. Let us first re-establish ourselves- be liberated, resume our democratic process, recover from our suffering- and then we can, from a position of sovereignty, evaluate when and how to upgrade our relationship with Israel-an upgrading which cannot be dissociated from the Middle Eastern peace process.”

He added: “Both Israel and Syria have spoken about a ‘security zone’ on their borders to justify their presence in Lebanon. Though neutrality, we would be offering them security in all of Lebanon. After their withdrawal from Lebanon, and when the middle- eastern peace process allows it; we would be ready to negotiate a convention of neutrality with each of our neighbors, clearly defining our relations and reinforcing their commitment to our neutrality.

This will be easier with Syria, because you have no problem negotiating with Damascus right now, but it may be more difficult with Israel as long as the middle east peace process is frozen and as long as the only direct channel of communication with Israel is the armistice agreement-an agreement which, in fact, has given Lebanon and Israel mutually recognized borders since 1494”

But it was obvious, Edde said, that Israel not only opposed the neutral Lebanon proposition but would also do its utmost to stay in Lebanon for the next two or three years- it’s not to bring Lebanon under its control, than to use Lebanon is as a stepping stone towards the finals annexation of the West Bank.

“The Israelis ill continue to create difficulties fir the American peace-keeping effort in Lebanon until they stop President Reagan’s pressure to freeze the Jewish settlements in the West Bank – and for that Israel need to buy at least two to three years,” Edde Said. “Because within in the next 36 months, Israel will have brought to the West Bank more than 100,000 new Jewish settlers and most of these will not be from the extremist Gush Emunim but from the liberal parties, like the Labor Party and the Peace Now Movement.

Those people will be lured to the west Bank by economic advantages, like housing subsidies, that are not available in Israel.

They will probably justify this move to their conscience by telling themselves that if the West Bank is given back to the Arabs, they ill be compensated financially and will then leave willingly. But in fact, after three years of this policy, you will not find one substantial Israeli leadership ready to give the West Bank back in return for peace. The West Bank and Gaza will not be negotiable any more, and then the only the only option will be a dual Israeli state, with the Arabs denied the right of Israeli Arabs, and those Arabs will eventuality be used as Israel’s intermediaries with the Arab world.”

The future of Lebanon, and obviously the proposed neutrality of Lebanon, hinges on a swift Israeli withdrawal from this country, and a swift withdrawal, Edde says, is still possible.

THE SUPERPOWER INCENTIVE  

“It can be brought about in the next months, and it must – because time is not our side,” he said. “The only way to bring it about, and to force Israel to accept the neutrality of Lebanon, is to undertake a strong campaign to influence the U.S. policy-markers to keep up the momentum of peace-making…

“At this point, the Neutral Lebanon Movement supports the Lebanese government’s efforts to liberate and unify the country. We would like to see the Lebanese government more aggressive and more efficient in its national and international polities to encourage the dynamics of peace; to show U.S. public opinion the contrast between the safety in the Lebanese areas where the multi-national force is present and the unrest in the areas under the control of occupation forces; to drive home the point that it is worthwhile continuing the effort to enlarge the area controlled by the Lebanese government and the multinational force and to get the occupying troops put of Lebanon. We need to keep the momentum, and the momentum, and the momentum cannot be kept without a very strong lobbying effort in the U.S. specifically.”

The U.S may be persuaded to pressure Israel into pulling out of Lebanon, I said, but what interest would it have in accepting Lebanese neutrality or persuading Israel to accept it?

“There is no question that a liberated, neutral Lebanon would be a fantastic success story for the Reagan administration,” Edde said. “It would give the Reagan Administration the momentum to go ahead with its Middle Eastern peace -keeping effort and show that America is capable of delivering peace.”

As for the Soviet Union, a neutral Lebanon might not be a success story, but it would still give Moscow a host of advantages, he added.

“A neutral, free, democratic Lebanon should be a place in the Middle East which has a free press and an intelligentsia, where political parties can thrive and express any ideologies. It would be a place where a well-staffed Soviet embassy can be established to keep its ear to the ground in the Middle East, a place which is the nerve center to Middle Eastern opinion-making, a place which provides access to the intelligentsia of the Arab World.

“Furthermore, the Soviet would have in such a Lebanon, as they did in the past, a market through which they could sell their goods to the Arab countries with which they have no direct diplomatic or economic relations. Most of the Eastern Bloc goods sold to the gulf area for the last 20 years were sold through the Lebanese economic system.” 

And a long-range advantage for the Soviet Union: “The neutralization of the Middle East could start with a neutral Lebanon. The Soviet Union supported Austrian neutrality in 1955-56 with precisely this goal in mind: that a neutral Austria could be the first step towards neutralizing other European states, like Germany. It didn’t work out that way, of course, because of the gold war, but it could work in the Middle East, which is different from Europe. The Soviet Union is led by Europeans, and the relationship between Moscow and the European countries is a historical, emotional relationship. The Soviets’ relationship with the Middle East is more of a cold, economic, strategic relationship. The Soviet considers the Arab world and Israel to be a part of the U.S. sphere of influence, and for them a neutral Arab world would be better than an aligned Arab world.

“Now, the Soviet Union may prefer other choices in Lebanon, but if they have to choose between a stable, free, democratic, neutral Lebanon and an Israeli-satellized Lebanon, they will opt for Lebanese neutrality.”

THE LEBANESE PRIORITY

But before selling Lebanese neutrality to anyone, the idea must be sold to the Lebanese themselves.

“And I expect that a majority of the Lebanese will support the idea,” Edde said.” It would be hard for any faction in Lebanon to reject it. The neutrality of Lebanon was initially a Christian dream; because the Christian minority felt that neutrality would protect Lebanese independence from ideologies would protect Lebanese independence from ideologies coming in from the Arab world and the Moslem world.

But now, Israeli factor has been introduced as a challenge to the Arab world, and Israel has advanced from the stage of establishing its presence in the region to the phase of expansion, to the phase of imposing its imperial leadership over minorities in the Middle East. In this situation, e would see the leaders of the Moslem and non-Maronite communities supporting the idea of neutrality, because neutrality is Lebanon’s shield against Israeli hegemony. We in Lebanon have been caught between two different powers, and we have all become defensive minorities.”

For the Lebanese majority to rally around the neutrality proposal, Edde said, the Lebanese government must adopt the idea.

“The Lebanese government has not declared a position on this question yet because it is engrossed in the bargaining going on through the U.S. negotiator,” he said. “I believe, however, that a government position on this question is needed even as the bargaining is under way, to define it, announce it to the U.N. and the Arab League and ask the U.S. to negotiate within its framework. We must affirm that neutrality is what we are offering, that we would be grated if the U.S. helped in the mechanics, but that we cannot offer more.

“Neutrality must not be used as a tool to impose an Israeli peace, because an imposed Israeli peace would rule out Syrian and PLO withdrawal by negotiation. That would mean another round of Israeli-Palestinian and Israeli-Syrian war in Lebanon, and no one could guess what the future of Lebanon’s independence and Lebanon’s identity- and the identity of Syria- would be after another round.”

Edde said that there were some officials in the present Lebanese administration “who have privately expresses to me their support of Lebanese neutrality and indeed, some of them, like (Lebanese’s U.N.) Ambassador Ghassan Tueni adopted public positions on the subject before I declared the program of the Neutral Lebanon Movement.

“But that is not enough. The Lebanese government must come out of the closet and tell the world not only what it does not want but also what it wants. It must take a firm position in favor of neutrality;

A neutral Lebanon could be the first step toward a neutral Middle East, which would avert a possible world war

and I am certain that the Lebanese would rally around it.”

Edde said that he himself had so far avoided talks with high-level Lebanese officials on this subject, “because I feel that I should not personally interfere in their process of negotiations.” But there are indications that several Lebanese personalities, possibly members of the Neutral Lebanon Movement, are mounting a lobbying effort aimed at the highest echelons of Lebanese officialdom.

Exactly who the members of the Neutral Lebanon Movement are Edde is not ready to reveal as yet.

“When we apply to the Lebanese authorities (to register the new movement), we will give a full list of the members, and we do intend to apply. The movement is now present in many cities in the U.S. and Europe. We started it abroad because it was the only way Lebanese of all communities, Moslem and Christian, could meet, agree on something and start.

A Lebanese majority would support neutrality, but the Lebanese government must first adopt the idea and announce it as a policy  

Contacts with the foreign governments which have been playing a role in Lebanon- like France, the U.S. and some Arab countries. However, we went the movement to be based in Lebanon, and I plan to return to Lebanon soon to structure it here. Until then, I would prefer not to name any members.”

He was, however, prepared to say this : “For the time being, we are structuring the movement with people from the National Bloc and other political parties and with nonpartisan Christian and Moslem personalities from all Lebanese regions…

“We think we have a good chance of rallying Lebanese who would be reluctant to support any idea promoted by a specific political leader. We hope to be able to avoid the limitations of Lebanese village politics. We have avoided any major political name because we don’t want any political personality to limit the accessibility of the movement. A movement such as this will have less of a chance to succeed if it is organized around political leaders or if it is organized as a political party. When Israel’s peace Now movement, for instance, tried to venture into the electoral process and operate as a political party, it was a disaster, and the movement quickly retreated, going back to being an intellectual political pressure group working to establish a network of personalities and young-generation militants from all political parties and of people not committed to any political party.

The same is true of West Germany’s Green Movement, and the same applies to us. We want to avoid being a new political party or a cluster made to be the tool of any political personality.

“Our movement is self-financed and will remain self-financed. It must keep the moral prerogative, because without it, it cannot challenge ruthless militaristic factions and ruthless political regimes. And because we have to keep the moral prerogative, the quality of the people in our movement is one of our main concerns: the members of the movement must be totally ‘clean’. Only those people can make the difference.

Roger Edde, whose law office in Beirut as destroyed hen the Lebanese war started in 1975, has spent the past seven years shuttling between Cairo, Riyadh, Paris, and Washington. In 1980, after a visit to Washington with Raymond Edde, he decided to stop his law practice and devote his time to lobbying for Lebanon, covering his own expenses.

“I am not involved in any business activity now, and will not be,” he told me, “because I am to be mobilized full-time for the movement”.

He left Beirut shortly after I talk to him last week and is now in the United States preaching Lebanese neutrality.  

Some Arab and European States have supported Lebanese neutrality, and top-level French Officials have called it the best solution for Lebanon.

Lebanese neutrality must be endorsed by the Security Council and can be reinforced by bilateral agreements with the states contributing the Multinational force.

A Neutral Lebanon would remain part of the Arab League and the free world, with diplomatic relations with Israel for the time being.

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Article signé par le Dr Nabil Khalifé, journaliste et chercheur  lors d’un entretien avec Roger Eddé

حياد لبنان …..  أي حياد؟

الحياد – المصير : روجيه اده

 

بقلم د. نبيل خليفة:

( لبنان والخيار الرابع: الحياد او التحييد)

يعيش اللبنانيون اليوم أقسى فترات القلق والضياع كلهم قلقون وكلهم خائفون، وكلهم يتساءولون : وماذا بعد؟ … والى اين؟ صحيح ان تسع سنوات من عمر الحرب كانت مصدر قلق لهم ولكنهم اليوم اكثر قلقاً لسبب واضح وهو: مأساتهم قد جربت كلها… وفشلت: كانوا يعتقدون (معظمهم على الاقل) بأن الخيار السوري العربي هو الحل فجربوه… ولم ينجح وها هو يجربونه مرة اخرى عله ينجح …. ولكن ثمانين قتيلاً ومئتين وخمسين جريحاً في يوم واحد ليسوا من علامات النجاح ! وكانوا يعتقدون (كثيرون منهم على الاقل) بأن الخيار الاسرائيلي قد يحمل الحل، فجرب نفسه… ولم ينجح ولسنا نعلم اذا كان سيقوم بتجربة ثانية تحاول ان تستفيد من التجربة الاولى لعلها تنجح اكثر. ومع ذلك، فحظوظ النجاح قليلة!. وكانوا يعتقدون (بكثرتهم الساحقة) بأن الخيار الاميركي كبديل للخيارين السوري والاسرائيلي، هو الذي سيفرض الحل. وكم كانت دهشتهم كبيرة وحزنهم عميقاً حين رأوا آمالهم تنهار بين أيديهم برؤية الولايات المتحدة تنسحب (والاصح تسحب) من لبنان في واحدة من اكثر المواقف انهزامية في تاريخ الدول العظمى في العصر الحديث!.

…. وهكذا فأن العودة مجدداً الى تجربة هذه الخيارات الثلاثة التي جربت من قبل وفضلت هذه العودة هي مصدر قلق اللبنانيين وسبب وضعهم داخل الدائرة المفرغة وامام الطريق المسدود.

فهل صحيح ان لبنان موضوع امام الطريق المسدود؟

وهل صحيح ان لا خيار امامه سوى الخيارات الثلاثة هي : السورية والاسرائيلية والاميركية منفردة ومجتمعة؟

الجواب بكل تأكيد كلا .

فأمام لبنان خيار رابع هو وحده خيار الطريق المفتوح… وخيار الحل الصحيح، انه الخيار الذي عمل ويعمل له بعض اللبنانيين (وغير اللبنانيين) من اولئك الذين استوعبوا المشكلة اللبنانية بأبعادها الداخلية والاقليمية والدولية وانطلقوا لمعالجتها من وعي تاريخي-جغرافي لوضع لبنان وقضية لبنان ومصير لبنان في ذاته وفي محيطه وفي العالم: انه خيار حياد لبنان الدولي.

وعلى رأس الداعين لهذا الحياد والعاملين له اليوم محام لبناني شاب هو الاستاذ روجيه اده .

– ينشط من اجل حياد لبنان.

– يدافع عن هذا الحياد ويبرره جغرافياً وتاريخياً وسياسياً ودولياً.

– يسعى الى اقناع القوى الدولية (والاقليمية والداخلية) بالقبوله به واعتماده كحل وحيد ومناسب للقضية اللبنانية.

أولاً – من أجل حياد لبنان 

1-مع روجيه اده لم يعد موضوع حياد لبنان مجرد امكانات او دعوة تطلق في مناسبة، او حلاً مثالياً بعد ان تفشل الحلول الاخرى، فلاول مرة منذ العام 1958 تاريخ دعوة الرئيس شارل حلو الى تحييد لبنان، يتحّول موضوع الحياد اللبناني الى ايديولوجية سياسية الى هدف تبذل من أجل تحقيقه (ويجب ان تبذل) كل الطاقات والامكانات المعنوية والمادية لان به وحده تحقيق خلاص لبنان وتأمين مستقبل مشرق للبنان واللبنانيين.

2-  وككل ايديولوجية لا بد من جماعة تدافع هذه الايديولوجية عن مصالحها، وبهذا المعنى فان جميع اللبنانيين (الذين يعرفون والذين لا يعرفون) هم الجماعة التي يخدم مبدأ الحياد مصالحها، كلهم من دون استثناء، ولكي يتم تأطير العمل والنشاط في خدمة هذه « الايديولوجية » انشأ المحامي روجيه اده « حركة لبنان المحايد » . إن انشاء مثل هذه الحركة يحمل في طياته معاني عدة منها:

– الايمان الراسخ بصحة مبدأ الحياد اللبناني وأهميته.

– تأمين الفاعلية الضرورية لترسيخ هذا الايمان لدى اكبر قدر ممكن من المعنيين بالوضع اللبناني في الداخل والخارج.

– الوصول عبر الايمان والفاعلية الى تحقيق حياد لبنان عبر القناعة اللبنانية والتوافق الدولي.

3- من أجل كل ذلك ينشط المحامي روجيه اده في الاوساط العربية  والدولية من خلال الاتصالات الشخصية بالقيادات السياسية:

سواء داخل الادارة الاميركية وفي مجلس الشيوخ الاميركي او داخل الحكومة الفرنسية ومع الوزير كلود شيسون بالذات او مع المستشار النمساوي برونو كرايسكي او مع وزير الدولة المصري للشؤون الخارجية بطرس بطرس غالي…. وكثيرين اخرين من القيادات السياسية العربية والغربية.

4- وفي خط مقابل يكتب المحامي روجيه اده المقالات في كثير من الصحف الغربية الكبرى محللاً المشكلة اللبنانية وداعياً الى حياد لبنان: في الواشنطن بوست، والنيويورك تايمز، والهرالد تريبيون والصن، والدايلي ستار… بالاضافة الى الصحف اللبنانية : الموندي مورننغ ، السفير ، الاوريان لوجور  وسواها.

ثانياً : أي حياد ؟ …. ولماذا؟

1- تهدف « حركة لبنان المحايد » الى تحقيق حياد لبنان على الطريقة النمساوية : حياد يخرج لبنان من الصراع العربي –الاسرائيلي من دون ان يفقد لبنان هويته العربية.

حياد يجعل لبنان خارج الصراع الاميركي –السوفياتي من دون ان يفقد لبنان انتماءه الى العالم الحر.

2-ان مبررات مثل هذا الحياد كثيرة ومتنوعة: منها المبررات التاريخية والجغرافية والسياسية والمصلحية. فمثل هذا الحياد يؤمن للبنان اكبر قدر من الضمانات الدولية مقابل ادنى قدر من الالتزامات تجاه الخارج، وهي الالتزامات التي تقيّد عادة الدول المحايدة.

السؤالان الجوهريان في الموضوع هما: لماذا الحياد؟ ولماذا على الطريقة النمساوية؟

3-على السؤال الاول يجيب المحامي روجيه اده ، ان كل الاحداث التي مرت بلبنان في العصر الحديث منذ العام 1840 حتى اليوم أثبتت حقيقة جوهرية وهي ان لبنان مؤلف من مجموعات دينية متوازنة وان كل انحياز من جانب هذه المجموعات او من احداها الى قوى خارجية تساهم في انقسام اللبنانيين وتزيد الفرقة بينهم وتؤدي الى عدم الاستقرار السياسي. والحال هذه لا يمكن حفظ وحدة الشعب في ظروف من الامن الاقليمي والسيادة الوطنية الا من خلال الحياد.

4-من جهة ثانية، ان حياد لبنان ليس دعوة غريبة او مستغربة بل هي دعوة طبيعية جداً انها حل له سوابق في التاريخ، تاريخ الدول الشبيهة بلبنان، فابتفاق الدول القوية، كانت الدول الضعيفة الموجودة في مناطق استراتيجية حيوية غالباً ما تسعى الى وضع حيادي من اجل ضمان خلاصها وسلامتها، اذن ان الحياد الدائم للبنان ليس انعكاساً لخيار معين، وانما نتيجة لحاجة وطنية كامنة في التاريخ المتعدد الاديان للبلد وكذلك في طبيعة اقتصاده الخدماتي.

5-من جهة ثالثة اظهرت السنوات القليلة الماضية ان ليس في قدرة اي قوة اقليمية ان تفرض ارادتها في لبنان على حساب قوة اقليمية اخرى، ولا يمكن لاي مجموعة داخل لبنان ان تصبح مرتبطة بقوة اجنبية خارجية من دون ان يؤدي ذلك الارتباط الى سفك الدماء وانتشار الفوضى، ولذلك، يضيف اده ، تبرز النتيجتان السابقتان فكرة ايجاد وضعية محايدة للبنان دائمة ورسمية  على غرار النموذج النمساوي، تضمنها الامم المتحدة في المحافل الدولية، ذلك ان مثل هذه الضمانات يمكنها فقط ان تحمي لبنان من الصراعات الدائرة في المنظقة، وتمنع تصعيد النزاعات الدولية ويمكن ان تساعد ايضا في الحفاظ على لبنان كدولة عربية وديمقراطية في العالم الحر.

في ضوء هذا الطرح ان مفهوم حياد  لبنان لا يعني ابدا التنازل عن شخصيته العربية او عن التزاماته الدولية. الحياد يعني باختصار كلي ، الا يكون لبنان ساحة للصراعات التي لا مكسب ولا مصلحة له في ان يكون طرفاً او فريقاً فيها: فقط من خلال الحياد يستطيع لبنان ان يتجنب النزاعات الداخلية فقط من خلال الحياد يستطيع لبنان ان يتهرب من حروب اقليمية يفرضها عليه موقعه الجغرافي فقط من خلال الحياد تستطيع كل من سوريا واسرائيل اعادة السلام الى لبنان.

6-ومن اجل مزيد من التوضيح لمبدأ الحياد هذا، يشدد ادّه على الناحية العسكرية الصرف. في هذا الحياد: « فحياد لبنان لا يعني ابداً حياده الايدولوجي والاقتصادري. فلبنان المحايد يبقى سيد قراره السياسي والاقتصادي ويبقى على تضامنه السياسي مع العالم العربي وعلى انتمائه الى العالم الحر ». وما يعنيه الحياد في هذا الحال هو ان الحكومة اللبنانية « تنكر اي حق لاية قوة اجنبية في استعمال ارض لبنان ساحة عسكرية لضرب دولة اخرى سواء في داخل المنطقة او خارجها.

7- ان النموذج النمساوي للحياد هو الاكثر ملائمة للبنان لانه يحقق اوسع المنافع والمصالح واكثرها للبنان وجيرانه (سوريا واسرائيل) وللعالم العربي وللعالم. لماذا؟  وكيف؟

*تسعى « حركة لبنان المحايد » الى تحقيق حياد لبنان، ولكنها في الوقت نفسه تتمسك بان يبقى لبنان عضواً اصيلاً وفاعلاً في المؤسسات الاقليمية والدولية فلا يعزله حياده عن الحياة الدولية. « فالحركة تبشر بحياد على النمط النمساوي لانها تريد ان يبقى لبنان عضواً في منظمة الامم المتحدة وفي جامعة الدول العربي وجزءاً من العالم الحر ». وفي وضع كهذا لن يكون لبنان المحايد، شأن النمسا، « ملزماً بتطبيق قرارات الامم المتحدة اذا كانت تتعارض مع حياده ».

*والنمسا، على رغم انها فاوضت الاتحاد السوفياتي على حيادها قبل ان تفاوض الولايات المتحدة، « ظلت من العالم الحر وعقدت اتفاقات خاصة مع المجموعة الاقتصادية الاوروبية ». ولبنان في هذا يمكنه ان يبقي على علاقاته الاقتصادية بالعالم العربي « والتي تشكل نحو 80% من اسباب ازدهاره، كما يمكنه ان يتمسك بمبدأ المقاطعة مع اسرائيل ما دامت هذه المقاطعة سارية المفعول من قبل المجموعة العربية من دون ان يتعارض ذلك مع مبدأ حياده.

*ويدعو روجيه ادّه الى ان يذهب لبنان المحايد اكثر مما ذهبت اليه النمسا. « فالنمسا عقدت اتفاقات ثنائية مع بعض الدول الضامنة لحيادها. ولكن على لبنان ان يصر على ضمان حياده من قبل مجلس الامن الدولي اولاً، لان هذا سيسمح بنا بان يكون حيادنا معترفاً به حتى من البلدان التي لا يوجد بينها وبين لبنان علاقات دبلوماسية مثل اسرائيل. (اعتراف دي فاكتو). و »زيادة على ذلك، على لبنان ان يوقع معاهدات حماية او دفاع مع قوى عالمية مختلفة مؤتمنة على حياده، وبخاصة مع تلك الدول التي تزود لبنان بقوات لحفظ السلام وهي قوات ينبغي ان تبقى في لبنان حتى يسترجع سيادته الكاملة ويقوى جيشه الوطني ».

*ان المصالح التي يؤمنها الحياد للبنان تندرج تحت العناوين العامة التالية:

وقف التدخل الخارجي في شؤون لبنان الداخلية.

تأمين الهدوء والاستقرار في حياة لبنان السياسية وحماية العملية الديمقراطية.

الاعتراف بلبنان دولة مستقلة ذات سيادة بحدودها الدولية المعترف بها.

وقف كل تهديد لسلامة لبنان وسيادته ووحدة اراضيه.

اعطاء الضمانات الحياتية والامنية للبنانيين ككل ولكل جماعة ( لكل طائفة)

بذاتها. »فالمسلمون (والعرب) يسترجعون بالحياد لبنان كبلد عربي من يد اسرائيل. والعرب يفضلون لبنان كبلد عربي حر مستقل ومستقر. وكذلك المسيحيون يجيدون في الحياد تطميناً للاقليات التي عاشت في خوف تاريخي مستمر من دفعها الى الوحدة بالاكراه. ان الحياد يساعد الموارنة في ان يكونوا اكثر انفتاحاً على العروبة، ويخفف من فرص النجاح للميول الانعزالية. فتحييد لبنان وقبول ذلك من العرب تطمين نهائي للمسيحيين الى ان لبنان اصبح، باعتراف دولي وعربي اجماعي بلداً نهائياً.

       –  جعل لبنان الدماغ الاقتصادي لدول المنطقة وتحقيق ازدهار اقتصادي سريع. « فديناميكية السلام واستقرار الحياد سوف يجذبان الاموال العربية والدولية الى لبنان ».

وباختصار، ان لبنان سيجني من الحياد منافع كثيرة: الامن والسلام والازدهار والطمأنينة له ولابنائه وللآخرين من حوله ايضاً.

       *من حيث امن سوريا، فان لبنان محايداً سوف يكون من شأنه ان يقضي على اي ذريعة لتدخّل اسرائيلي يهدد الاراضي السورية عبر لبنان.

       *من حيث أمن اسرائيل، فان لبنان محايداً سوف يكون من شأنه ان يسمح لاسرائيل بان تضمن لنفسها سلاماً في لبنان في انتظار السلام مع لبنان. فاسرائيل تجاذف بالصراعات الداخلية على رمال لبنان المتحركة. واذا كانت هناك نية سوفياتية لفتنمة لبنان بالنسبة الى اسرائيل، فقد تذهب اسرائيل، والحال هذه، بعيداً باحتلال لبنان وتهدد ايضاً وحدة سوريا واستقرارها.

       من اجل هذا يرى روجيه ادّه ان « اذا كان الحياد اللبناني مضموناً دولياً، وكانت الحدود الاسرائيلي – اللبنانية والسورية – اللبنانية حدوداً عازلة وتحت رقابة قوة دولية مقبولة من لبنان واسرائيل وسوريا، فهذا سوف يعطي اسرائيل الامن الذي تريده على حدودها الشمالية. ان لبنان محايداً هو المخرج الوحيد لاسرائيل من « الفتنمة » داخل لبنان ».

       وعلى الجملة « ان على  اسرائيل ان تعتبر نفسها راضية بالسلام في لبنان وبتحييد حدودها مع هذا البلد، حتى يحين اليوم الذي يتمكن فيه لبنان القوي بوحدته الوطنية، وبديمقراطيته المنبعثة من جديد والمعافاة، والمدعوم من حلفائه الطبيعيين في العالم العربي، ان يعقد سلاماً لن يعزله عن محيطه الاقتصادي والثقافي، وسوف يكون هذا السلام بالنسبة الى اسرائيل سلاماً حقيقياً. في انتظار ذلك، يجب ان يكون اعلان الحياد الدائم كافياً لاسرائيل لكي تنسحب من الاراضي اللبنانية « .

       *من حيث امن الفلسطينيين، ان لبنان محايداً سوف يساعد على حماياتهم من اي اضطهاد عسكري، كما يساعد على ارضاء احتياجاتهم الاقتصادية والانسانية في انتظار طموحاتهم الوطنية »… وعلى اللبنانيين، والحال هذه ومن ضمن مفهوم الحياد اللبناني، « ان يطمئنوا الفلسطينيين ويخلقوا لديهم شعوراً بالامن والطمأنينة، كما عليهم ان يدرسوا الوجود الفلسطيني في لبنان بجدية كبيرة: كيفية اعطائهم الحماية، كيفية حصولهم على حقوقهم الاجتماعية والاقتصادية. وكيفية مساعدتهم على اللحاق بعائلاتهم أينما وجدوا في الشرق الاوسط، وتأمين عيشهم بشروط اجتماعية مقبولة حتى يأتي يوم لا يعودون فيه لاجئين ».

       والخلاصة، ان لبنان محايداً سيكون ذا منافع كثيرة  بالنسبة الى محيطه، فهو سيعيد للعرب من جديد اسواقهم ومكان اجتماعاتهم، ومكان « لجوئهم »… كما تعوّد ان يكون. « والاهم من ذلك ربما هو ان نجاح تجربة الحياد اللبناني ستغري دولاً عربية كثيرة في الشرق الاوسط لمحاكاتها وعلى رأس هذه الدول دول الخليج التي بدأت تدعو علناً الى تحييدها في الصراع الدائر في الخليج. ويرى روجيه ادّه ان اكبر خطر محتمل للمواجهة بين الجبارين اليوم هو منطقة الشرق الاوسط ». والحل الوحيد لتجنب هذا الصدام هو الوصول الى تحييد منطقة الشرق الاوسط (انطلاقاً من حياد لبنان) وهو حياد يسمح للمنطقة بان تتطور اقتصادياً وتربوياً.  فلن تكون نهضة في العالم العربي ما دامت طاقات العرب تهدر على الصراع العربي – الاسرائيلي والصراع العربي – الايراني.

       *بالنسبة الى الولايات المتحدة، ان تحييد لبنان سيكون نجاحاً باهراً للادارة الاميركية وسيفسح في المجال امام الحكومة الاميركية لتتقدم خطوات الى الامام من اجل ايجاد حل سلمي لازمة الشرق الاوسط. وهذا سوف يظهر ان اميركا قادرة على تحقيق السلام.  ومن جهة ثانية، يمكن القول، بل الاستنتاج: ان أمن اسرائيل وسلامتها باعتبارهما من اهم هواجس الادارات الاميركية واهدافها، وبما ان حياد لبنان هو معيار لهذين  الامن والسلامة على حدود اسرائيل الشمالية، فان تحقيق حياد لبنان هو ذو نفع كبير بالنسبة الى الولايات المتحدة.

*اما بالنسبة الى الاتحاد السوفياتي، ان لبنان حراً ومحايداً وديمقراطياً سوف يحقق للسوفيات منافع لا يستهان بها:

حرية الصحافة،

حرية المعلومات،

حرية الاحزاب بما فيها الاشتراكية.

بحيث يصبح لبنان « مركز تنصّت على منطقة الشرق الاوسط ».

-والاهم من ذلك ان يكون حياد لبنان مدخلاً الى حياد دول المنطقة فلا تعود خاضعة للهيمنة الاميركية. ان عالماً عربياً محايداً  هو افضل للسوفيات من عالم عربي متحيز وخاضع للنفوذ الاميركي. فالسوفيات ربما يفضلوا خيارات اخرى (لصالحهم غير الحياد) ولكن اذا كان عليهم الاختيار بين لبنان مستقر وحر ومحايد من جهة، ولبنان تحت النفوذ الاسرائيلي (الاميركي من جهة ثانية) فانهم سيختارون لبنان المحايد بكل تأكيد.

ثالثاً – مواقف القوى من حياد لبنان

في ضوء الاتصالات والنشاطات والطروحات التي تقوم بها « حركة لبنان المحايد » لتحقيق حياد لبنان، ما هي الصورة التي يمكن رسمها لمواقف القوى اللبنانية والاقليمية والدولية من فكرة حياد لبنان؟

1-    على الصعيد اللبناني:

حياد لبنان كان بالاساس « حلم المسيحيين (الموارنة) لان الاقلية المسيحية كانت تشعر ان الحياد حماية لاستقلال لبنان من الايديولوجيات (التوتاليتارية) العربية والاسلامية ». اما المسلمون فكانوا يناهضون هذه الفكرة لانها تجعل لبنان خارج الصراع العربي –الاسرائيلي.

فلبنان لا يمكنه ان يكون محايداً تجاه اسرائيل، خصوصاً ان الكثير من المسلمين لم يكونوا يدركون بالتمام مدى ما تشكله اسرائيل من خطر عليهم ايضاً. ولكن بعد الاجتياح الاسرائيلي للبنان ودخول اسرائيل قلب بيروت الغربية، ومدى علاقة اسرائيل بالاقليات في المنطقة،  « بدأ زعماء مسلمون وآخرون غير موارنة يؤيدون فكرة الحياد باعتبارها تشكل ضمانة ضد اسرائيل ». وهكذا اصبحت فكرة حياد لبنان مبدأ جامعاً لكثير من التيارات والمواقف لصحافيين ورجال سياسة ونواب (الحسيني – ابو شرف – غصن) ولرجال فكر وباحثين من كل الفئات والاتجاهات. « وفكرة الحياد يجب ان تأتي من اللبنانيين انفسهم وانا اتوقع ان اكثرية اللبنانيين سوف تؤيدها ».

       *هذا على الصعيد الشعبي العام. اما على الصعيد الرسمي فيرى روجيه ادّه « ان الحكومة اللبنانية لم تتخذ حتى الآن موقفاً من الحياد، وعليها الاخذ به واعلانه في الامم المتحدة والجامعة العربية. فحتى الآن قالت الحكومة بلسان مندوبها في الامم الماتحدة (غسان تويني) ما لا تريد. (اي ان لا يكون لبنان ساحة صراع لحروب الآخرين) وعليها الآن ان تقول ماذا تريد بالضبط. اي ان تأخذ موقفاً ثابتاً لمصلحة حياد لبنان. ومن الاكيد ان اللبنانيين سيلتفون حولها ».

2– على الصعيد الاقليمي:

*بالنسبة الى الموقف العربي من موضوع لبنان، يقول روجيه ادّه انه « لم يتلق اي ردات فعل سلبية من جانب السعودية او سوريا حول هذا الموضوع. اما بالنسبة الى منظمة التحرير الفلسطينية فهو لا يعتقد بانها تمانع في حياد لبنان بعدما اعلن زعماء المنظمة الفلسطينية انهم تخلوا نهائياً عن فكرة استعمال لبنان منطلقاً لاي عمل عسكري ضد اسرائيل. لقد قالوا ذلك للحكومة اللبنانية وقالوها لي ايضاً ». اما بالنسبة الى مصر فان الاتصال بالسيد بطرس غالي كان مشجعاً للغاية بحيث شرعت مصر في التنسيق مع فرنسا حول ضرورة حياد لبنان. وذهب غالي الى القول « ان عمله كان قد اقترح حياد لبنان في الثلاثينات اي قبل وضع ميثاق جامعة الدول العربية ». فلبنان المحايد لن يخل باي التزام من التزاماته العربية السياسية والثقافية  والاقتصادية داخل الجامعة العربية وخارجها. والجهاز الوحيد الذي يجب ان يكون لبنان خارجه هو مجلس الدفاع العربي المشترك ولقد تبين لنا خلال الثلاثين سنة الماضية ان هذا المجلس لن يكن فعالاً ولم يساهم، ولو بنسبة ضئيلة، في اي من الحروب التي خاضها العرب. لذلك نعتقد، يقول روجيه ادّه، ان بخروجنا من هذا المجلس لا نخسر شيئاً. اذ كما يقول غسان تويني « نحن لا نتنازل عن شيء غير موجود اصلاً ».

*اما بالنسبة الى موقف اسرائيل، فقد كانت ضد فكرة الحياد قبل العام 1982. وكان مناحم بيغن يرفض فكرة الحياد باعتبار انه وضع في جملة حساباته توقيع معاهدة سلام مع لبنان، وان الحياد سيقدم له اقل مما تستطيع ان تقدمه له معاهدة سلام.

ولكن موقف اسرائيل تبدّل اخيراً (بعد الغاء معاهدة 17 ايار). فقد ابلغ ديفيد كيمحي الحكومة الاميركية رسمياً خلال آخر زيارة له للولايات المتحدة ان اسرائيل توافق على حياد لبنان. وفي محاضرة له امام مجموعة من الاختصاصيين في سياسة الشرق الاوسط قال كيمحي، ما معناه، ان حياد لبنان هو الحل الوحيد لوقف المواجهة السورية الاسرائيلية في لبنان. وبالمقابل فان اوساطاً قريبة من حزب العمل الاسرائيلي وحركة السلام الآن تبدي مواقف ايجابية من فكرة حياد لبنان.

3- على الصعيد الدولي:

       *يمكن القول ان فرنسا (ومعها المجموعة الاوروبية) توافق على حياد لبنان بل تدعم هذا الحياد. وتصريح كلود شيسون وزير العلاقات الخارجية الفرنسي واضح اذ قال: قد يأتي يوم يصبح فيه لبنان كله محايداً ».

       *المستشار النمساوي برونو كرايسكي اكد من جانبه لمؤسس حركة لبنان المحايد « ان الاتحاد السوفياتي سيوافق بالتأكيد على مشروع لحياد لبنان ».

       *اما الادارة الاميركية التي ناقشها المحامي روجيه ادّه بموضوع حياد لبنان فقد وجدها مقسومة الى فئتين:

فئة تؤيد حياد لبنان وترى انه الحل الوحيد والمناسب للازمة اللبنانية، شريطة ان يظل لبنان جزءاً من العالم الحر.

وفئة ثانية هي الاقوى حتى الآن لا تزال تعارض فكرة حياد لبنان لاسباب جوهرية خلاصتها:

*ان الولايات المتحدة تعتبر لبنان وبالتالي المنطقة المحيطة به منطقة نفوذ اميركية. وكل اتجاه نحو تحييد لبنان هو انتقال من منطقة نفوذ اميركية الى منطقة رمادية بين الولايات المتحدة والاتحاد السوفياتي، وهذا ليس في مصلحة اميركا.

*ان الولايات المتحدة تخشى ان يكون حياد لبنان مدرجة تنقل العدوى الى دول الخليج العربي – الفارسي، مما يجعل هذه الدول البترولية تطالب بالحياد وتتجه الى تطبيع علاقاتها مع الاتحاد السوفياتي، وهو ما يتعارض والاستئثار الاميركي بالنفوذ في تلك المنطقة.

*ان الولايات المتحدة تقف من حيث المبدأ ضد التيارات التحييدية، وهذا ما فعلته في اوروبا: فقد كان الهدف من مسارعة الاتحاد السوفياتي الى تأييد حياد النمسا تعميم هذا الحياد على العديد من الدول الاوروبية.

واذا لم تكن هذه الفكرة قد تحققت آنذاك فان في اوروبا اليوم تيارات (حركة ويلي براندت المستشار الالماني السابق) تعمل لاقامة اوروبا محايدة. وهذه التوجهات تتعارض مع السياسة الاميركية سواء على صعيد المواجهة العسكرية (التسلح ونصب الصوريخ في اوروبا)، وربما يخشى الاميركيون ان يكون حياد لبنان مدخلاً الى حياد منطقة الشرق الاوسط في صراع الجبارين.

ولكن « حياد لبنان يصبح المخرج الوحيد المفروض ربما، كما يقول المدير العام السابق لوزارة الخارجية اللبنانية السفير كسروان لبكي، في حال اقتسام المنطقة بين الولايات المتحدة والاتحاد السوفياتي على خط نفوذ يشمل ايران والعراق وسوريا من جهة، والمناطق الباقية في اجزيرة العربية وسواها من جهة ثانية ». 

الخلاصة: 

كثيرون هم الذين تكلموا (وما زالوا يتكلمون) على حياد لبنان.

ولكن، لاول مرة، تأخذ هذه الفكرة مع روجيه ادّه  بُعداً يمتلك المشاعر والعقل والنشاط ويملأ الذات ويتخطى الانتماءات الحزبية والمذهبية ليعانق الهدف الكبير، هدف « ما هو أفصل للبنان »: هدف المصلحة اللبنانية العليا!

وحدهم العاملون لحياد لبنان يتمتعون برؤية تاريخية ووعي تاريخي!

ولهم وللبنان المحايد معهم، بهاء المستقبل!!

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